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The U.S. military has supported U.S. law enforcement in counter drug-trafficking 
efforts since the 1980s; the interagency counterdrug approach developed during that 
period—and still used today—focuses primarily on interdiction of cocaine conveyances 
in transit from South America to Central America. Increasing violence in the countries 
through which the cocaine transits is evidence that this approach is not working. 
Furthermore, the U.S. “rebalance” toward Asia and a worsening shortfall of interdiction 
assets signal a new strategic and operational environment that requires a counter threat 
network (CTN) approach.  
Instead of simply attacking a functional trafficking network, as does an 
interdiction-focused strategy, we combine traditional Operations Research (OR) 
maximum flow and attacker-defender problems with social network analysis to directly 
interdict the traffickers’ social-management network (and the resources it provides) in 
order to obtain indirect—yet potentially more effective—disruptions of the functional 
network. The Drug Trafficking Organization Social-Functional Network Interdiction 
(DTOSFNI) model described herein can be used to provide insight in order to combat the 
numerous trafficking organizations in a coherent manner—rather than relying upon 
independent, often isolated, investigations—and inform development of the Organized 
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Consolidated Priority Organization 
Target (CPOT) list and its associated investigations.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The U.S. military has supported U.S. law enforcement in counter drug-trafficking 
efforts since the 1980s; the interagency counterdrug approach developed during that 
period—and still used today—focuses primarily on interdiction of cocaine conveyances 
in transit from South America to Central America. Increasing violence in the countries 
through which the cocaine transits is evidence that this approach is not working. 
Furthermore, the U.S. “rebalance” toward Asia and a worsening shortfall of interdiction 
assets signal a new strategic and operational environment that requires a counter threat 
network (CTN) approach.  
Due to this shortfall in interdiction assets and changing strategic environment, a 
new operational-strategic approach for countering drug trafficking from Latin America is 
warranted—one that seeks to disrupt not the vessels carrying the contraband, but instead 
the coordinators and financiers who resource the enterprise. Rather than a tactical 
question of how to best interdict trafficking conveyances, we seek to address questions of 
strategic and operational import by showing the benefit of interdicting the traffickers’ 
social-management layer directly in order to achieve indirect effects on the physical flow 
of cocaine by removing the resources needed to conduct such movement. In doing so, we 
provide a potential roadmap for achieving three action items, and supporting a fourth, 
identified in the 2015 National Drug Control Strategy: 
 (6.3.A) improve our knowledge of the vulnerabilities of transnational 
criminal organizations, 
 (6.3.C) target transnational money laundering networks to deny drug 
trafficking organizations illicit financing and money laundering 
capabilities,  
 (6.3.D) target cartel leadership and their networks, and  
 (5.1.B) improve intelligence exchange and information sharing. 
This thesis also provides an analytical approach to identifying which parts of the 
trafficking network may be good candidates for knowledge or intelligence development. 
Thus, improved prioritization schemes—based coherently on overall threat network 
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vulnerabilities vice independent individual- or DTO-based discriminators—may be used 
in the development of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) 
Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list and its associated investigations. 
While we use hypothetical, open-source data for our representative DTO network, 
specific Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) data can be applied to the model in order to 
evaluate specific, real-world attack scenarios.  
The trafficking of cocaine is a physical process involving a physical commodity. 
The constraints of geography and limited conveyance types allow us to define a 
functional network that is comprised of specific tasks that must be accomplished in order 
for cocaine to reach the U.S. homeland. For instance, cocaine can only be transported to 
Central America by air or by sea. Likewise, cocaine smuggling across the southwest 
U.S.-Mexico border can only be accomplished via air, surface, or sub-surface means. 
This functional workflow process forms the backbone of our model. Unlike traditional 
maritime and other interdiction strategies (such as the one currently employed by DOD 
and U.S. law enforcement), however, we do not directly interdict this functional network. 
Cocaine does not move by itself. There are people and organizations that seek to 
profit from its movement and sale, and these drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs, 
expend resources in order to maximize that profit, whether through the arbitrage of the 
cocaine’s value as it nears the U.S. or from its direct sale. Using hypothetical data based 
on open-source material, we define a social network of three main categories of 
archetypical DTOs (with associated DTO-specific identifier code): those operating in the 
source zone (A and B), intermediate-level transport organizations in Central America and 
Mexico (C, D, F, and I), and core Mexican cartel-level organizations (E, G, and H). Each 
of these organizations has a particular role in the trafficking enterprise and an associated 
mindset or agenda, which helps define their steady-state resources immediately available. 
We assume that these DTOs cooperate to varying degrees as a single enterprise, and that 
all decisions made by each DTO will be for the benefit of the whole. 
By combining the social network and the functional network into a single social-
functional network, we can observe how certain organizations with a given set of 
resources act in order to move the maximum amount of cocaine each month to the U.S. 
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homeland. We then use an attacker-defender optimization as the basis of our analysis. 
While the defender (e.g., traffickers) attempts to maximize accrued rewards, the attacker 
(e.g., U.S. law enforcement and military) attempts to minimize this outcome. Known as a 
min-max Stackelberg game, the attacker moves first to interdict one or more social nodes, 
followed by the defender’s response to that attack (maximize cocaine flow along the 
surviving paths and/or shift resources between social entities to enable such flow).  
Our Drug Trafficking Organization Social-Functional Network Interdiction 
(DTOSFNI) model is a linear program representation of the conceptual social-functional 
network. The trafficking enterprise seeks the optimum distribution of resources to 
maximize steady-state monthly financial profit in the equivalent of millions of U.S. 
dollars (USD). It allows the enterprise to decide what types of resources to apply to 
which functional tasks, and whether or not to shift resources between DTOs. The model 
rewards the traffickers for moving an amount of cocaine to each successive level in the 
network, reflecting the increasing value of cocaine as it nears the U.S. market. The model 
also imposes costs to employ a given type of resource for a given task, as well as 
penalties for shifting resources between social entities and for attempting to move 
resources through, or apply resources from, an interdicted social node. 
We enumerate the possible attack plans and determine results for an un-
interdicted base case, and when one, two, or three DTOs are attacked. This allows us to 
better determine priorities for investigation and attack among the various DTOs and 
allows us to quickly see alternatives if a particular attack plan is not available to us in the 
real world. We can also use secondary information provided by the DTOSFNI model to 
evaluate evidence-gathering prospects or to observe potential responses by remaining 
DTOs under a given attack plan. This also provides insight on how best to sequence 
attacks against particular DTOs. 
The base case moves all 53.0 metric tons (based on hypothetical data to maintain 
appropriate classification levels) of cocaine produced each month by the Colombian 
sources to the U.S. homeland, netting the traffickers $5.3 billion in monthly profit (note 
these are hypothetical numbers for this instance of the problem). We find that, overall, A 
and E are the most lucrative targets, followed closely by B and F. Combinations of these 
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organizations tend to yield greater profit reductions, while combinations of the other 
DTOs tend to be inconsequential. Some multi-attack combinations provide no additional 
reductions or perform worse than plans with fewer attacks. 
When only one attack is available, the top three attack plans—A, B, and E—all 
focus on DTOs that provide significant contributions to the task of moving cocaine from 
Colombia to Central America primarily by maritime means. Reductions in profit (or 
flow) for these three attack options range between 12.6‒21.2%. 
When two attacks are available, three of the top five performing attack plans 
include DTO-A, and four of the top five incorporate either or both of the source zone 
DTOs. The dual AB attack yields the best results as it essentially cuts off Colombia from 
the rest of the supply chain. We also see that a single attack on DTO-E dominates any 
other dual attack against two Mexican cartel-level DTOs, with the exception of the GH 
combination. Reductions in profit for the top five dual attack options range between 
34.1‒91.0%. 
The triple attack options yield some interesting results. The dual AB attack again 
dominates every triple attack plan, and the 2nd-best dual AE attack dominates all but two 
triple attack plans, with the exceptions being EFG (74.4% profit reduction) and AEF 
(63.5%). As with the dual attack results, a triple attack plan focused on the Mexican 
cartel-level DTOs (the EGH attack) is dominated by at least seven other multiple-attack 
plans.  
While no one needs a model to see that isolating a geographically-constrained 
cocaine-producing region from the rest of the supply chain yields the greatest profit and 
flow reductions, the DTOSFNI model is useful in addressing, “What else?” if such an 
attack plan is not feasible. The quantitative model also allows us to truly analyze what 
would be impossible to do so manually or qualitatively.  
Just the process of obtaining and inputting data into the DTOSFNI model also 
provides significant value to decision-makers. First, the process requires the explicit 
identification of assumptions. Next, archiving these assumptions in a common format 
should allow different parties in the “blue” network (such as the Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. military and other intelligence agencies, 
etc.) the ability to share such knowledge and challenge disparate estimates more 
transparently. Finally, increased sharing of such structured information (policy 
restrictions notwithstanding) allows for the development of a true counterdrug Common 
Operational Picture (COP). One such manifestation of this COP could be a living 
diagram of the social and functional networks as described in this thesis. 
Potential applications of the DTOSFNI and its process, therefore, include not just 
“simple” targeting prioritizations, but also identifying knowledge gaps and policy 
obstacles to information sharing across the counterdrug community. Empowerment of 
information-sharing fora, beyond what has already been—and continues to be—done at 
JIATF-S as an example, and using a comprehensive approach may provide the 
counterdrug community with a means for increased success against cocaine trafficking. 
The OCDETF CPOT list is another coordinating mechanism. Though it is unclear 
whether a comprehensive prioritization of investigative effort occurs, the DTOSFNI 
model can be extremely useful in supporting such an approach. Removing all the major 
Mexican cartels is not the answer, even if it were feasible. However, removing the right 
combinations of DTOs can achieve significantly greater reductions in profit, and the 
DTOSFNI model can help identify which combinations to pursue. 
The DTOSFNI model can also be used to anticipate DTO responses to attack, at 
least in terms of social resource transfers and direct applications to the functional 
network. While we focus on how attacks change the level of overt activity of a particular 
behind-the-scenes DTO, this same approach can be used to evaluate how any DTO may 
react to a network attack and law enforcement can set up evidence-gathering efforts 
accordingly. Evidence-gathering and actual interdiction activity can and should inform 
each other: they are not mutually exclusive goals. 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the value of combining traditional 
operations research and social analysis techniques into a hybrid model that considers both 
the social actors themselves and the goals they are attempting to achieve, in order to 
evaluate interdiction options to disrupt achievement of those goals. The drug trafficking 
 xx
problem is certainly a very complex and extensive one and there is no guarantee of 
obtaining optimum attack results by simply “eyeballing” the problem using experience 
and instinct. The results clearly indicate that DTOs are not alike and cannot be targeted 
haphazardly. However, we have shown that a comprehensive, methodical, and analytical 
approach, such the one used to develop the DTOSFNI model, can help elicit otherwise 
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The global cocaine market is estimated to be an $85 billion per year enterprise, 
while the size of the U.S. cocaine market is estimated to be about $38 billion annually 
(OAS 2013). Not only is there a significant economic incentive for cocaine traffickers to 
continue operating, there is also an outsized economic detriment to the United States 
society. The overall economic cost to society of illicit drug use was estimated to be 
$193 billion in 2007; assuming cocaine accounts for roughly one-third of this number, the 
socio-economic cost of cocaine use alone exceeds $64 billion annually (NDIC 2011). 
Then there is the human cost of cocaine trafficking; according to the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, deaths in the United States from cocaine overdose in 2013 numbered 
approximately 5,000, a 29% increase from 2001 (NIDA 2015).  
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been involved in counterdrug operations 
since 1989, but in many ways the security situation in Mexico and Central America has 
only gotten worse in that time. Recent changes to national priorities and budgetary 
pressures make the DOD Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) mission 
even more difficult to execute. Tactical interdiction-centric operational approaches have 
improved over the years due to previous studies and research, but these approaches rely 
upon one critical assumption: the continued availability and employment of military-
provided maritime interdiction assets. The recent retirement of the U.S. Navy’s Oliver 
Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates (FFGs) in September 2015 calls into question 
this central assumption. While the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was redesigned and re-
designated as a frigate (FF), this platform has not yet been fielded in significant numbers 
and the U.S. Navy’s strategic shift to the Pacific theater suggests that these ships will not 
be prioritized for future counterdrug missions. 
Due to this shortfall in interdiction assets, this thesis suggests that a different 
operational-strategic approach for countering drug trafficking from Latin America is 
warranted—one that seeks to disrupt not the vessels carrying the contraband, but instead 
the coordinators and financiers who resource the enterprise. We illustrate that the 
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interdiction of the people or organizations that supply these resources may disrupt 
trafficking indirectly, and on an even greater scale. 
A. COCAINE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING: A DESTABILIZING THREAT 
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal entities that exist primarily to 
make money from the trafficking of illegal narcotics, and networks operating between 
South and North America increasingly threaten the security of the United States and that 
of its partners in Central America and Mexico. While these DTOs create revenue through 
a myriad of illicit activities—from drug production and smuggling, to human- and 
weapons-trafficking—cocaine trafficking remains the primary driver for the DTOs’ 
existence. The unique origins of cocaine, the continued demand in the United States, the 
geo-physical considerations of transporting the contraband, and the existence of already 
weak Central American government institutions combine to create trafficking corridors 
that extend from the Andean region of South America to the U.S. Southwest Border. 
Numerous competing and collaborating DTOs operate along these corridors with relative 
impunity. 
Cocaine is a drug derived from the coca plant, which grows only in the 
mountainous Andean region of South America. While estimates vary, production-based 
methods used by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) indicate that 
about 633 metric tons (t) of cocaine are produced annually. Of this estimated amount, 
roughly 55–59% is smuggled into the United States, with nearly this entire portion being 
sourced in Colombia (ONDCP 2012).  
As indicated in Figure 1, approximately 91% of the cocaine flow into the U.S. 
transits what is known as the Mexico-Central American Corridor, with the rest moving 
through the Caribbean Corridor (ONDCP 2012). The Darién Gap—a large break in the 
Pan-American Highway in the swampy and largely impassable region between Colombia 
and Panama—is a natural barrier to transit and, hence, ground-based drug trafficking. 
This gap forces any northward flow of cocaine along the Mexican-Central American 
Corridor to use airborne or seaborne transit modes along two distinct vectors: an Eastern 
Pacific (EPAC) vector (53% of total flow) and a Western Caribbean (WCARIB) vector 
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(38% of total flow). Nearly all of the flow through this corridor transits one or  




Figure 1.  Map of Cocaine Trafficking Corridors and Vectors 
Adapted from: Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012) Cocaine Smuggling in 
2012. Report, United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, DC. 
The 2011 ONDCP estimates for the distribution of cocaine trafficking conveyances on 
the way to the United States is shown in this graphic. It is unclear whether this 
distribution refers to total tonnage by conveyance or to the number of trafficking events 
by conveyance. The primary conveyance used is the go-fast boat (accounting for over 
70% of cocaine flow), followed by the self-propelled semi-submersible. Aircraft account 
for a smaller percentage of conveyances used, and primarily operate in the Western 
Caribbean vector. This thesis focuses on the 91% of cocaine that flows to the U.S. via the 
Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean vectors in the Mexico/Central America Corridor. 
There are three primary conveyance types used to transport cocaine from South 
America into Central America: surface maritime vessels, maritime submersibles, and 
aircraft. While some cocaine is trafficked via fishing vessels (such as an Ecuadorian 
panga) or other commercial motor vessels, for the purposes of this thesis all surface 
maritime conveyances are considered to be a go-fast boat (GFB)—a fast, lightweight 
speedboat made of fiberglass to minimize radar signature, which accounts for a vast 




Figure 2.  Go-Fast Boat 
A suspected drug-trafficking go-fast boat is chased down by Bahamian police. Photo 
courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard. 
A self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) is a purpose-built submarine 
constructed from fiberglass and with a low freeboard (Figure 3). Early SPSS designs 
were smaller and could only carry about five metric tons (t, or tonnes) of cocaine, but 
these vessels have grown larger over the years, with some capacities approaching 12t 
(Davis 2013).  
 
 
Figure 3.  Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible 
U.S. Coast Guard personnel inspect a captured SPSS carrying roughly 7.3t of cocaine. 
Photo courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard.  
For the purposes of this thesis, there are three main types of representative aircraft 
used: twin-engine aircraft (such as the Cessna 402) for long-range transport from South 
America to Central America and then onward into Mexico; single-engine aircraft (such as 
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the Cessna 172) for short-range transport; and ultralight aircraft for cross-border transport 
from Mexico into the USA (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4.  Representative Drug-Trafficking Aircraft 
Clockwise from Left: Cessna 402, Cessna 172, and an ultralight. Photos courtesy of 
Wikipedia.org. 
This model also uses ground-based resources (to include commercial trucks and 
private automobiles) to transport cocaine. Table 1 summarizes rough capacities for the 
various types of conveyances described herein. 







Twin-engine Aircraft 0.4–1.4 
Single-Engine Aircraft 0.2–0.3 
Ultralight Aircraft 0.1 
Commercial Truck 0.05–0.9 
Automobile 0.03 
Capacity per unit resource varies dependent upon where the resource is applied and in 
what quantity. This is described in further detail as a capacity function in Chapter III. 
The effect of the trafficking of cocaine and other illicit drugs through Central 
America and Mexico cannot be denied, and the illicit trafficking networks that permeate 
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this corridor are an increasingly destabilizing regional security threat. As shown in 
Figure 5, despite the counter-narcotics activities of the U.S. government (USG) 
interagency—to include the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Navy (USN), and Joint Interagency 
Task Force South (JIATF-S) among others—the homicide rates in Honduras, Mexico, 
and Belize have increased rapidly since 2006. Furthermore, illicit trafficking is such a 
lucrative enterprise that DTOs, as a whole, generate more revenue than many Central 
American countries spend on their entire security sectors. In some cases, the value of the 
drugs being moved annually through a given Central American country can exceed 14% 
of that country’s GDP (UNODC 2012).  
 
 
Figure 5.  Homicide Rates for the Northern Triangle, Belize,  
and Mexico (2003–2012) 
Adapted from: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) Global Study on 
Homicide 2013. Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. In 2012, the 
homicide rates per 100,000 persons in the Northern Triangle countries—Guatemala 
(39.9), Honduras (90.4), and El Salvador (41.2)—far exceeded the rates of Mexico (21.7) 
and the U.S. (4.7, not shown). Mexico, Belize, and especially Honduras have seen a 
significant increase in homicide rate since 2006 despite ongoing counterdrug efforts. 
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The violence and disruption is not limited to areas far removed from the U.S. 
homeland. In 2014, the massacre of 43 college students in Mexico was linked to drug 
traffickers and corrupt officials. In July 2015, Joaquín Guzmán-Loera aka El Chapo, head 
of the preeminent Sinaloa Cartel, escaped from a Mexican prison after being in custody 
barely over a year. Furthermore, in his 2014 Posture Statement to Congress, General John 
F. Kelly, commander of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), testified, 
“Driven by economic pressures and rising criminal violence, the number of Hondurans, 
Guatemalans, and Salvadorans attempting to cross the U.S. Southwest border increased 
60% in 2013” (Kelly 2014). According to a memorandum summarizing the conclusions 
from an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) meeting on Central America, “U.S. security 
is intimately linked to the security and prosperity of Central America” (NSC 2014). 
Furthermore, the 2015 National Security Strategy identifies transnational organized crime 
associated with weak or failing states as a top strategic risk to U.S. national interest 
(Obama 2015a).  
B. JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH: A HISTORY 
The threat to the U.S. from cocaine and drug trafficking is not new; U.S. 
government efforts to counter such activities date to the early 1980s and the rise of 
powerful Colombian drug cartels. The failure of traditional civilian law enforcement to 
effectively counter this rising threat led the Reagan Administration and Congress to 
conclude that greater centralized authority—via a dedicated, standing national task force 
supported by the military—was needed (Munsing and Lamb 2011).  
Beginning with the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (PL 97-86), 
Congress amended the Posse Comitatus Act—which limited the ability of the federal 
government to use military personnel for domestic law enforcement—to allow the 
Secretary of Defense to support federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement 
agencies with the “use of military equipment and facilities,” as well as “the use of 
information” (e.g., intelligence and surveillance); prohibitions against use of DOD 
personnel to directly conduct searches, seizures, and make arrests remained in place. 
Essentially, this amendment allowed U.S. Navy vessels to track, follow, and stop a 
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suspected drug smuggling vessel, while embarked law enforcement or USCG personnel 
would conduct the actual boarding, searches, and arrests.  
Subsequently, several presidential directives and congressional actions further 
modified the U.S. government’s counterdrug approach. President Reagan’s National 
Security Decision Directive 221 “declared narco-trafficking a national security threat and 
authorized the Secretary of Defense” to expand DOD counternarcotics involvement in 
1986 (Munsing and Lamb 2011). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (PL100–690) 
established the ONDCP in the Executive Office of the President to facilitate 
“coordination between executive branch departments and agencies” and to certify that 
their drug control budget submissions were “consistent with the National Drug Control 
Strategy [and/or] Program.” The Act also authorized the President to “designate lead 
agencies with areas of responsibility for carrying out the National Drug Control 
Strategy.” As such, and in keeping with intent of the Posse Comitatus Act modifications, 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 (PL 100-456) “designated 
DOD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring [(D&M)] of drug trafficking into 
the United States, and the [US] Coast Guard as the lead agency for interdiction and arrest 
[(I&A)]” of the drug traffickers themselves (Munsing and Lamb 2011).  
This approach centered almost exclusively upon the interdiction of drug 
trafficking routes. The DOD established several regionally aligned joint task forces 
(JTFs), organizations comprised primarily of military members from two or more 
military departments (Navy, Air Force, or Army) operating under a single joint force 
commander and assigned a narrow task or set of tasks. A JTF may also have civilian 
members employed by a given military department. Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4) in Key 
West, Florida, was one of several new regionally-aligned counter-drug JTFs, and was 
responsible for D&M in the Caribbean (Munsing and Lamb 2011). The military-centric 
JTF-4 construct was a step forward in interagency cooperation in the war on drugs, but 
had no dedicated assets and had no way to compel cooperation from the various force and 
asset providers (Munsing and Lamb 2011).  
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In 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 14 (PDD-14), 
which shifted the American counterdrug focus closer to the source countries. This 
signified a strategic shift away from solely stopping narcotics shipment “to a more evenly 
distributed effort across three programs:  
 Assisting Institutions in… nations… that demonstrate the political 
will to fight the narcotics syndicates…. [and] strengthen the 
political will to combat trafficking in key countries where that 
commitment is weak…. 
 Destroying Narco-Trafficking Organizations… in a coordinated 
program to arrest… the narcotics syndicate leadership…. defeat 
narcotics money laundering…. [and] control the precursor 
chemicals essential for drug production…. 
 Interdiction… at and near the border, in the transit zone [between 
South America and the United States], and in source countries.” 
(Clinton 1993a) 
Additionally, Clinton’s Executive Order 12880 consolidated more authority for the war 
on drugs in the ONDCP (Clinton 1993b). In order to overcome the shortfalls of the JTF 
structure, ONDCP issued the first National Interdiction Command and Control Plan 
(NICCP) on April 17, 1994, which introduced the concept of the Joint Interagency Task 
Force (JIATF), an organizational structure “‘manned and led by personnel from the 
various agencies with a drug interdiction mission,’” including civilian organizations such 
as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(Munsing and Lamb 2011). Furthermore, as a “national task force” the JIATF command 
structure was such that physical assets of these agencies could now be put under its direct 
tactical control (Munsing and Lamb 2011).  
The former JTF-4 became JIATF-East, and JTF-South, an existing task force with 
only cursory involvement in the drug war, became JIATF-South (Munsing and Lamb 
2011). Later, these two organizations combined to comprise the current JIATF-South 
(JIATF-S) organization, which nests militarily under USSOUTHCOM. Today the 
command has three primary mission areas—encompassed in Operation MARTILLO 
(Hammer)—through which it supports U.S. and partner nation security: D&M 
operational support to multiple international and interagency stakeholders; information-
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intelligence fusion; and facilitation and/or support to I&A operations conducted by 
interagency or international interdiction forces.  
C. A SHIFTING OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
Despite the comprehensive approach prescribed by PDD-14, Operation 
MARTILLO follows a traditional operational approach—born in the 1980s—that is 
heavily oriented toward tactical maritime D&M and support to I&A (primarily U.S. law 
enforcement entities) of drug trafficking vessels on the high seas. This focuses more on 
the actual drug conveyances and/or crew of the vessels used in the drug trafficking 
enterprise than upon the higher-level coordinators or financiers of the enterprise (though 
there are nascent efforts to look at this aspect at the JIATF-S level). Due to the vastness 
of the JIATF-S area of interest (AOI), this approach requires significant amounts of 
USCG and USN assets with correspondingly high direct Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) costs, as well as indirect capital acquisition costs. The strategic environment that 
produced this traditional approach, however, no longer exists. 
1. The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region 
Beginning with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s article for Foreign 
Policy in October 2011, and followed shortly thereafter with a President Obama address 
to the Australian Parliament, the Obama Administration announced a strategic “pivot” 
toward the Asia-Pacific theater (Scappatura 2014). A Congressional Research Service 
report observes that this pivot, later re-branded by the Administration as a “rebalancing,” 
appears to have been prompted by  
China’s growing military capabilities and its increasing assertiveness of 
claims to disputed maritime territory, with implications for freedom of 
navigation and the United States’ ability to project power in the region; 
the winding down of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 
efforts to cut the U.S. federal government’s budget, particularly the 
defense budget. (Manyin et al. 2012) 
The impact of this rebalancing upon the U.S. Navy is readily apparent in its 
submission for the President’s Budget for FY 2015 (PB-15). At the time of Chief of 
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Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert’s testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on March 27, 2014, 46% (48 of 104) of the Navy’s deployed ships 
were operating in the Pacific theater; revised PB-15 goals project over 54% (67 of 123) 
of the Navy’s deployed ships will operate in the Pacific theater by 2020 (Greenert 2014). 
This increased naval emphasis on the Pacific theater comes at a cost of reduced naval 
presence in other theaters, “which in turn could increase risk for the United States in 
those regions. While the United States does not want to reduce its commitments in the 
Middle East… high priority capabilities… may be strained by simultaneous demands” in 
both the Pacific and Middle East theaters (Manyin et al. 2012). It is no big leap to 
conclude that naval assets to support Operation MARTILLO will come at an extreme 
premium. 
2. Operational Gap: Retirement of the U.S. Navy’s Counterdrug 
Workhorse 
Concurrent with this strategic rebalancing, the operational paradigm is also being 
upended. Throughout its entire history since the end of the Cold War, JIATF-S and its 
predecessors have been heavily reliant upon the U.S. Navy’s FFGs as the primary 
interdiction asset; however, the last Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG was retired from the 
fleet in September 2015. While the USCG and other partner nations provide some 
maritime assets, they lack the complete capability package that the FFG brought to bear. 
The DTOs constantly innovate and there is some evidence that some are attempting to 
design and build fully-submersibles (Watkins 2011), but current USCG vessels do not 
have an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability. This is just one example of how the 
lack of a ready frigate replacement leaves a significant interdiction asset gap for JIATF-S. 
While the Clinton military drawdown in the mid-1990s, and the start of the Global 
War on Terror in the early 2000s, marked previous periods of military austerity in the 
JIATF-S AOI, any reduction in FFG assets was offset by organizational or procedural 
improvement. The transition from JTF-4 to the JIATF construct helped foster improved 
intelligence collection (especially of human intelligence sources), fusion, and 
dissemination. Even in the face of declining resources, “continuing improvements in 
intelligence networks and operational practices allowed [JIATF-S] to increase its 
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[tactical] success in interdictions and arrests” (Munsing and Lamb 2011). Several NPS 
theses continue to contribute to improved efficacy of the few assets provided in terms of:  
 Improved probability of detection and classification of semi-submersibles 
through improved pre-positioning of interdiction assets (Pfeiff 2009); 
 Improved probability of interdiction by considering a trafficker as an 
adaptive adversary and pre-positioning interdiction assets and/or regularly 
changing interdiction plans accordingly (Bessman 2010, Gift 2010); 
 Improved search patterns through the use of probability models to 
determine where a trafficker may transit the maritime domain (Pietz 2013, 
Mooshegian 2013, Campos 2014); and 
 Development of probability maps of trafficking vessel locations by 
combining multiple types of intelligence from both sensor-based and 
human-based sources (Zlatsin 2013).  
Even these measures and improvements have a limited effect if the reduction in 
the amount of assigned interdiction assets is too great. At a certain point, there are 
insufficient patrol vessels to have meaningful presence in the traditional trafficking lanes. 
An adaptive DTO may simply wait for a patrol ship to return to port or clear out of an 
area and then send its GFBs and SPSSs. From FY2007 through FY2009, JIATF-S 
consistently interdicted about 233t of cocaine per year on average (Kelly 2013). The loss 
of Forward Operating Base Manta in Ecuador, which had provided domain awareness 
and presence in the Eastern Pacific south and west of the Galapagos Islands, marked  
the beginning of a decline in the amount of cocaine interdicted from 154t in FY2010 to 
132t in FY2013 (Kelly 2013, Kelly 2014). The 15% decrease in interdicted cocaine 
during this recent four-year period cannot be explained by changes in the underlying 
amount of cocaine trafficked alone since the flow estimates for a similar period 
(FY2010–2012) range from a 9% decrease using consumption-based estimates, to a 27% 
increase using production-based estimates (ONDCP 2012).  
3. Irregular Warfare Methods for a New Paradigm 
Stemming this reduction in naval assets, however, will not eradicate cocaine 
trafficking, and putting such a heavy emphasis on direct cocaine interdiction arguably is a 
piecemeal solution at best. In his 2014 Posture Statement to Congress, General Kelly 
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lamented, “If bulk shipments are not interdicted before making landfall, there is almost 
no stopping the majority of this cocaine as it moves through Central America and Mexico 
and eventually lands on street corners across America” (Kelly 2014).  
This observation indicates that Building Partner Capacity (BPC) efforts to 
increase Central American nations’ ability to interdict cocaine trafficking themselves will 
be required (Santos 2015). Santos, Bagley, and Shaham (2015) conducted an unclassified 
study of a hypothetical Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) infiltration into the U.S. via 
existing drug trafficking routes and found that a single capable land partner can 
effectively replace up to 12 maritime interdiction ships and achieve the same probability 
of interdiction. However, BPC activities often take years to yield results, and there 
remains the imbalance of partner nation financial resources to build capacity versus the 
traffickers’ financial incentives and amassed resources.  
This WMD study suggests that the criticality of intelligence—even if only 
partially correct—and an understanding or awareness of how the threat networks operate 
is of even greater importance. Dozens of interdiction assets—or a combination of 
interdiction assets and a land-based BPC effort—are not enough to significantly reduce 
the chances of a WMD infiltration. Knowledge or intelligence of the threat network, 
however, provides some of the biggest reductions in this probability, and we must view 
network exploitation as a battlespace shaping tool to develop this understanding (Santos, 
Bagley, and Shaham 2015). Since the WMD infiltrator is assumed to use existing drug 
trafficking routes and organizations, the results of this study and adaptations of the 
analytical methods it uses may be informative for counterdrug strategies as well. 
To simply ask for “more” intelligence collection, however, is not a viable 
solution. In the author’s experience, the limited intelligence collection and analysis 
capabilities available tend to focus on “high-value targets” or organizations, but with 
little or no emphasis on secondary or supporting entities. In the counterdrug context, this 
would be akin to focusing intelligence collection on El Chapo and/or his DTO since he is 
a high-profile trafficker, but not on lesser-profile supporting or cooperating DTOs that 
may actually yield better results in terms of overall network disruption.  
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Due to the strategic rebalance to Asia and a worsening shortfall of operational 
assets, the JIATF-S J5 Plans and Policy Directorate sponsored this thesis to explore how 
alternative Counter Threat Network (CTN) approaches (such as those based upon 
Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) methods refined during recent operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan) may provide viable alternatives to the current paradigm. The 
underlying alternative hypothesis claims that incorporating a CTN approach—which 
includes employing alternative non-Major Combat Operation (non-MCO) assets focused 
on the D&M mission set and improving coordination with service component BPC 
activities to improve Central American security forces—into Operation MARTILLO 
should result in greater visibility of the illicit trafficking threat networks, and ultimately 
in higher overall interdiction effectiveness.  
D. SCOPE, GOAL, AND BENEFITS OF STUDY 
While an overwhelming majority of current JIATF-S efforts focus on interdicting 
the physical modes of drug transportation, the GFBs and SPSSs, much less effort at this 
tactical level is devoted to developing and understanding the human social-management 
aspect of the trafficking problem, which is a key CTN function (JDSD 2011, USCG 
2014). Rather than a tactical question, we seek to address questions of strategic and 
operational import by showing the benefit of interdicting the DTO social-management 
layer directly in order to achieve indirect effects on the physical flow of cocaine by 
removing the resources needed to conduct such movement. In doing so, we provide a 
potential roadmap for achieving three action items, and supporting a fourth, identified in 
the 2015 National Drug Control Strategy: 
 (6.3.A) improve our knowledge of the vulnerabilities of transnational 
criminal organizations, 
 (6.3.C) target transnational money laundering networks to deny drug 
trafficking organizations illicit financing and money laundering 
capabilities,  
 (6.3.D) target cartel leadership and their networks, and  
 (5.1.B) improve intelligence exchange and information sharing (Obama 
2015b). 
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While the example we use in this thesis specifically addresses 6.3.A and 6.3.D, 
the same approach can be applied to 6.3.C. With respect to supporting item 5.1.B, this 
thesis also provides an analytical approach to identifying which parts of the trafficking 
network may be good candidates for knowledge or intelligence development. Thus, 
improved prioritization schemes—based coherently on overall threat network 
vulnerabilities vice independent individual- or DTO-based discriminators—may be used 
in the development of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) 
Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list and its associated investigations.  
Due to the nature and relative inaccessibility of Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) 
data, we do not determine best interdiction plan against a specific cartel, such as the 
Sinaloa Cartel or the Los Zetas Cartel, nor do we consider restricted data specific to 
certain individuals, such as El Chapo. Rather, we intend to illustrate how our approach 
can provide insights using hypothetical, open-source data. Therefore, we represent the 
entire set of cocaine trafficking operations as a single enterprise comprised of DTOs that 
cooperate to varying degrees. The Drug Trafficking Organization Social-Functional 
Network Interdiction (DTOSFNI) model introduced in Chapter III lays a foundation upon 
which more specific and/or sensitive data can be applied in order to provide specific, 
actionable recommendations to U.S. counter-narcotics planners and operators. Inevitably, 
there will always be missing data, and the data development section in Chapter IV can 
help provide some methods by which informed assumptions regarding this type of data 
can be made. 
This thesis also seeks to contribute to an overarching strategic framework under 
which may nest subsequent operationally- and tactically-focused NPS theses in support 
of JIATF-S and/or USSOUTHCOM. The main benefit is to illustrate the viability of an 
indirect approach to the cocaine trafficking problem. While we seek to show how certain 
types of DTOs or personnel may be more lucrative targets for interdiction, we do not 
make any assumptions on how to execute such an interdiction. However, the results of 
this study should help inform JIATF-S and USSOUTHCOM decision-makers on what 
types of capabilities to request in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) budgeting 
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process, and identify typical nodes in the threat social network upon which to begin 
further knowledge development and exploitation. 
E. SOCIAL-FUNCTIONAL NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
Our effort explores how the interdiction or disruption of a social network may 
affect the DTO functional workflow process, or workflow processing rate, for moving 
contraband through the system. We use open-source data to define a general workflow 
model along with and geographical routing and typical transportation assets, and to 
define a single social network of cooperating DTOs to represent the entire cocaine 
trafficking enterprise (i.e., no major competitors exist in this scenario). This approach 
considers the following questions: 
 WHAT is the threat’s driving motivation or goal? 
 HOW is this goal achieved operationally? 
 WHO is controlling and/or resourcing the operation? 
For the purposes of this thesis, the WHAT is essentially this: to make money via 
the sale of cocaine. Drug traffickers create revenue through arbitrage and physically 
moving an illicit commodity from its source closer to the point of consumption. The 
measure of interest in this model is the steady-state maximum net revenue, or profit, of 
the system in terms of USD per month. This profit is driven primarily by the amount of 
cocaine flow that actually reaches the U.S. homeland (and its associated street market). 
The HOW comprises a certain process, or sequence of operations and/or actions, 
that must be taken in order to achieve the traffickers’ goal. This operational process 
follows a general pattern, or workflow, due to the physical nature of the commodity 
itself, the geography across which it must be transported, and the various modes of 
transport used to transport it. We represent this workflow as a functional network that 
captures the drug flow northward to the U.S.  
In general, these types of tasks cannot be accomplished without some sort of 
human-in-the-loop control mechanism. In this case, the control mechanism is a set of 
human managers or actors WHO provide resources that enable the functional workflow 
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tasks to be accomplished. We define a social network representing a single generalized 
Mexican cartel, along with its ancillary allies and enabling organizations throughout 
South and Central America and Mexico. Once integrated into a single model, we interdict 
the social network and measure the impacts upon the functional network throughput. The 
following sections describe the functional and social sub-networks, along with the overall 
combined social-functional network. 
1. A Representative Functional Trafficking Network 
Figure 6 is a general representation of the overall threat functional workflow 
network. While this appears to be a single network, there are two distinct halves: 1) the 
drug workflow side, and 2) the financial remittance workflow side. Some tasks or actions 
may not follow this exact sequencing; for instance, some laundering may occur within the 
United States prior to “exit.” While not shown in Figure 6, there would be several 
feedback links from the financial workflow side to the drug workflow side that signify 




Figure 6.  Overall Drug Trafficking Functional Network 
A conceptual overview of the overall cocaine trafficking enterprise with a counter-
clockwise flow is shown here. The overall functional network includes a Drug Workflow 
side (Left-to-Right flow in the lower part of the figure), which moves physical cocaine 
product from South America to the United States, and a Financial Workflow side which 
moves drug remittances from the United States to South America (Right-to-Left flow in 
the upper part of the figure). Each of the boxes represents a task or action to transport 
narcotics in one direction (toward the U.S.) or bulk cash and other monetary instruments 
in the opposite direction (toward Central and South America). The solid lines indicate 
logical connections between functions. The dotted line on the right indicates a 
transactional conversion of cocaine into cash. In general, the color scheme generally 
defines where a function is accomplished: purple functions in South America, orange 
functions in Central America and Mexico, blue functions across the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and green functions in the U.S.  
While the entire network is shown for contextual purposes, this thesis focuses on 
the drug workflow half of the functional network, as there is more open-source 
information available regarding this part of the enterprise and the methods of cocaine 
transit are relatively limited. However, the same methods used in this thesis can be 
applied to the financial portion of the enterprise if LES data were to be made available. 




Figure 7.  Detailed Drug Workflow Functional Network 
A detailed blowup of the Drug Workflow side of Figure 6 using the same color 
convention is shown by this graphic. Beginning on the left, the functional network has 
two Colombia cocaine sources, which are geographically separated and feed either the 
Pacific Vector or the Caribbean Vector. Cocaine from each source can be moved to the 
respective coastline via truck or can be directly airlifted to Central America. Omitted for 
clarity is a “Trans-Colombia Transit” function, which airlifts cocaine from a source to its 
opposite coastline (i.e., from Pacific source to Caribbean coastline). With the exception 
of the three Pac and Carib transit tasks and the three blue Import tasks—which are 
unimodal—all tasks shown are aggregated multi-modal tasks. The USA Sink, or final 
destination, is geographically located in Phoenix, Arizona. The double-line arcs represent 
logical connections between the functions, which conduct the physical flow of cocaine. 
The two geographically-separated sources in Colombia roughly represent the 
three largest cultivation departments that feed the two major trafficking vectors: Nariño 
and Putumayo in southwest Colombia primarily feeding the Pacific vector, and Norte de 
Santander in northeast Colombia primarily feeding the Caribbean vector. The USA Sink, 
or final destination, is geographically located in Phoenix, Arizona.  
The double-line arcs, or arrows, represent logical connections between functional 
nodes and involve no physical movement. In geo-physical terms, the arcs in Figure 7 
represent transfer locations, such as warehouses, airstrips, river mouths, etc.  
Each node, or box, of the FNet represents a movement task to be accomplished. 
Entering a node signifies that a load of cocaine is located at a geographic point of 
departure and is ready for transit. Exiting a node signifies that the load of cocaine is 
located at a geographic destination and is ready for the next level of transport. We 
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incorporate this geo-physical aspect into the model by splitting each functional node into 
its entry and exit sub-nodes (see Figure 8). The physical movement of cocaine occurs 
between these sub-nodes over one or more resource-specific directional arc(s). All further 
discussion of FNet arcs refers specifically these split-node arcs.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Detailed Magnification of a Functional Network Node 
This magnification is an example of a typical FNet task node that is split into two 
geographical sub-nodes connected by one or more resource-specific directional arcs. 
Each FNet node encompasses physical movement of cocaine from one geographical 
location to another via one or more modes of transit. In this case, cocaine can move from 
the “Southern Honduras” sub-node to the “Guatemala-Mexico Border” sub-node via any 
combination of trucks, single-engine aircraft, or twin-engine aircraft. The next functional 
node in the supply chain, “Mexico Transit,” would have a corresponding “Guatemala-
Mexico Border” sub-node as its entry point. For the purposes of this thesis, the term 
“FNet arc” refers to the split-node connecting arcs, as depicted here. 
Referring back to Figure 7, Pacific vector transit occurs via either SPSS or GFB 
replenished mid-route by a Logistic Support Vessel (LSV) due to the longer travel 
distances. Caribbean vector transit only occurs via GFB (no LSV support required). 
Transit through Central America and Mexico is multi-modal, but these are not separated 
due to the common geography of the routes. Importation across the U.S.-Mexico border 
is again split due to the distinct nature or routing of the disparate transit modes. Ground 
importation is multi-modal, but only for trucks and automobiles. Air importation is multi-
modal, but only for single-engine, twin-engine, or ultralight aircraft which require an 
airfield and/or dirt strip. 
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The functional drug workflow network is a simplified abstraction due to the 
relative inaccessibility of LES data and a desire to keep this thesis unclassified. The 
following is a summary of key assumptions for this part of the model: 
 Our hypothetical DTOs use Colombia as the only source country for U.S.-
bound cocaine. 
 Baseline steady-state cocaine source production and maximum non-
interdicted network throughput is set at 53t per month based upon the 
intent of the traffickers to move all of the estimated annual cocaine 
production (roughly 633t per 2012 ONDCP estimates). 
 SPSSs are restricted to operations in the EPAC vector, and route from 
Colombia to Honduras. 
 GFBs using the EPAC vector take a circuitous route toward the Galapagos 
Islands before heading northward to Central America. This requires 
refueling and replenishment at sea via a Logistic Support Vessel (LSV). 
GFBs using the WCARIB vector do not require LSV support. 
 Only air and maritime assets can transport cocaine from Colombia to 
Central America. Only air and ground assets can further transport cocaine 
through Central America, Mexico, and into the U.S. 
Additional assumptions with respect to transportation asset types and capacities 
can be found in Chapter IV and/or Appendix A. 
2. A Representative Social-Management Network 
Figure 9 is a depiction of a generalized cocaine trafficking drug operation, which 
itself is a conglomeration of several DTOs, which include cooperating DTOs that 
specialize in certain tasks in the functional network. As a whole, this Social-Management 
Network (SNet) manages the resources and assets to be used in the FNet. The nodes in 
Figure 9 represent DTOs with different roles within the SNet. Each DTO node has a 
supply of resources, such as GFBs, SPSSs, aircraft, trucks, and/or automobiles. We 




Figure 9.  Generalized Cocaine Trafficking Social-Management Network 
Red nodes (A and B) indicate source-zone DTOs that focus on cocaine transport from the 
South America sources to Central America. Light blue nodes (C, F, and I) indicate 
intermediate-level DTOs that primarily focus on cocaine transport through Central 
America and Mexico. The green node (D) indicates a money laundering organization that 
has minimal cocaine trafficking activity but can enable transfer of resources between 
disconnected social nodes. Dark blue nodes (E, G, and H) indicate the high-level 
Mexican DTOs that form the core of the cartel. The links indicate relationships between 
two DTOs, along with possible direct resource transfer between them. 
The source zone DTOs (A and B) provide resources to transport the bulk of 
processed cocaine from sources in Colombia to Central America. Due to the geographic 
dispersion of the coca growing regions, DTO-A focuses on transit through the EPAC 
vector while DTO-B focuses on transit through the WCARIB vector. While the 
distinction is not exclusive, as a small portion of each DTO’s efforts may encompass the 
opposite vector, it should be noted that DTO-A has little incentive to operate in the 
Caribbean vector since it has little follow-on supply-chain presence beyond the northeast 
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Colombian coastline. Note that these two DTOs do not have a direct link or arc. This 
represents an adversarial or competitive situation between the two DTOs and there is no 
direct cooperation whatsoever. 
The intermediate-level DTOs (C, F, and I) primarily provide resources to 
transport cocaine through Central America, Mexico, and/or into the U.S. While these 
DTOs utilize various modes of transit that include aircraft, trucks, automobiles, or some 
combination thereof, some of them may specialize in certain modes. For instance, DTO-I 
owns a trucking company and engages in cross-border trade, while DTO-F owns a 
trucking company and an air cargo company. 
Node D represents a Money Laundering Organization (MLO), a special entity that 
handles most, if not all, of the money generated by the cocaine trafficking enterprise and 
uses various methods to launder the revenues (usually obtained in the form of bulk cash). 
Node D does traffic some cocaine and technically would be considered a combined 
MLO-DTO, but is labeled strictly as “DTO-D” for this thesis. This entity would have a 
more prominent function if we were to consider the overall trafficking functional network 
(Figure 6); however, for this instantiation of the drug workflow portion of the functional 
network, it essentially handles disbursement of money across the social network. We 
indirectly model this function by allowing resources to “pass through” DTO-D with 
relative efficiency. 
The cartel-level DTOs (E, G, and H) are the informal leaders of the enterprise. 
These DTOs wield significant power in the network due to their geographic location in 
Mexico, acting as gatekeepers to the lucrative U.S. market. No other DTO can traffic 
cocaine into the U.S. without the blessing, or at least ambivalence, of the cartel DTOs. 
These three DTOs form a strong “Simmelian tie” triad as described in Chapter II. Of 
note, DTO-G is highly security-conscious, preferring to work behind-the-scenes to overt, 
exploitable activity in the functional network. Instead, DTO-G has a supply of excess 
resources that act as a reserve for the rest of the network. DTO-H overwhelmingly uses 
tunnels under the U.S.-Mexico border to import cocaine, while DTO-E is the most active 
of the three across the intermediate segments of the functional network “supply chain.” 
There exists significant U.S. political interest in taking down one or more of these cartel-
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level DTOs, especially DTO-G, due to the high levels of violence and corruption they 
cause so close to the U.S. homeland. 
A summary of these DTO roles and their associated mindset, or agenda, is shown 
in Table 2. These roles and mindsets are also used to develop the hypothetical data as 
described in Chapter IV. 
Table 2.   DTO Roles and Mindsets 
DTO Role(s) Mindset 
A Source Transit Primary focus on transport via the EPAC vector.  
B Source Transit Primary focus on transport via the WCARIB vector, 
with lesser focus on the EPAC vector. Uses some 
aircraft. 
C Intermediate Transit Primary focus on transit through Central America and 
Mexico via a mix of ground-based and airborne modes. 
D Intermediate Transit, 
Money Laundering 
Ships exclusively via aircraft. 
E Cartel Leadership Vertically integrated; most active cartel DTO along 
entire trafficking pipeline.  
F Intermediate Transit Owns air cargo company and trucking company. 
G Cartel Leadership Highly security conscious and prefers to operate 
behind-the-scenes with minimal overt activity. High 
U.S. political desire to interdict this DTO. 
H Cartel Leadership Primary focus on importation. Significant use of cross-
border tunnels from Mexico to US.  
I Intermediate Transit Ships exclusively via its own trucking company. 
A DTO’s role is an indicator of its association to the FNet geography and of its 
resourcing level relative to other DTOs, while a DTO’s mindset is an indicator of how it 
prefers to operate. As an example, a Source Transit DTO generally operates close to 
Colombia, while the mindsets shown indicate in which vector a given Source Zone DTO 
will usually operate.  
The dotted lines in Figure 9 indicate bidirectional arcs between nodes, and 
represent a relationship between two DTOs. This relationship allows the transfer of assets 
between DTOs, subject to a trust coefficient and to physical limitations (for instance, a 
SPSS cannot be transferred from DTO-A in Colombia to land-locked DTO-D in Mexico 
even though they share a connecting arc). This trust coefficient indicates the percentage 
 25
of assets that a source DTO is willing to share with a given destination DTO, thus 
representing the capacity of a given social arc.  
The social network is also a simplified abstraction due to the same reasons given 
for the functional network. The following is a summary of key social network 
assumptions:  
 The DTOs identified are the only ones operating in this space. 
 All relationship arcs and trust coefficients are known. 
 There are no command and control relationships, meaning DTO-C cannot 
direct DTO-A on what to do or how to do it. There is only a supplier-
buyer coordinating level of relationship. 
3. The Combined Social-Functional Network  
Linking the SNet with the FNet results in the combined Social-Functional 
Network (SFNet) model shown in Figure 10. This simplified depiction of the SFNet does 
not necessarily imply that a social node DTO connected to a particular functional node 
can apply its entire range of resources for that task. For instance, DTO-D connects to 
CENTAM (Central America) transit, which can make use of both trucks and aircraft, but 
is only able to apply aircraft to the function. Any trucks needed by CENTAM Transit 
must be provided by another DTO.  
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Figure 10.  Combined Social-Functional Network 
The SNet connects to the FNet via solid resource arcs (some social network arcs are 
removed for clarity). These arcs represent the possible functions that a given DTO may 
support given sufficient resources. The removal of a DTO means that any functional 
nodes to which it is connected do not benefit from the DTO’s resource supply. Other 
DTOs connected to those nodes may apply additional resources to increase flow capacity, 
but this siphons assets from elsewhere in the system. If a connected DTO does not have 
enough of a required resource, other DTOs may opt to transfer that resource to the given 
DTO, which in turn applies the asset to the function. 
Without the application of resources from any connected DTO, a function cannot 
be accomplished. Additional resources applied increase the cocaine throughput capacity 
of that functional node. In some cases, a DTO may provide all of the direct resources to 
accomplish a task; in other cases, several DTOs may contribute to the capacity of a task. 
The total amount of resources applied to each task has a corresponding, but diminishing, 
effect upon the capacity and throughput of the task. For instance, a single truck assigned 
to a particular FNet node may be able to carry 0.9t of cocaine, but two trucks assigned 
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(across all social actors) to the same functional arc may only have a total capacity of 1.7t 
(an average of 0.85t per truck). We represent each resource-dependent FNet arc capacity 
as a piecewise linear concave capacity function as described in Chapter III. The 
relationship of the SNet nodes, FNet nodes, and SFNet arcs is shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Detailed Magnification of Social Network Nodes  
and Functional Network Node 
This detailed magnification incorporates typical SNet nodes (blue ovals) and SFNet arcs 
(shown in grey) into the FNet split-node depiction from Figure 8. In this fashion, arcs 
only connect nodes. In actuality, each connected SNet DTO may apply resources to a 
node in order to enable resource-specific FNet arc capacities.  
The following are key assumptions specific to the SFNet not yet addressed in the 
SNet and FNet assumptions: 
 The un-interdicted SFNet can flow all source cocaine to the U.S. sink. 
 No direct interdictions of the FNet portion of the SFNet are allowed. 
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 Removal or interdiction of a SNet node removes all resources contained in 
that node; these resources are no longer available for FNet task 
accomplishment nor for sharing throughout the SNet. 
While not explicitly included in this model, each DTO has an unlimited operating 
budget and will use this budget insofar as this enables the use of resources to push more 
cocaine through the system. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis follows this structure: Chapter II is a review of 
existing literature in the field; Chapter III presents the network specifics, the attacker-
defender model, and the algorithms used to obtain a solution; Chapter IV discusses the 
instantiation of the problem, to include hypothetical data development, and numerical 
results from the model; and Chapter V summarizes the research and presents 
recommendations and conclusions. Appendix A provides detailed data not identified in 
Chapters I or IV, and Appendix B provides complete results in tabular format.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of previous work related to 
interdiction of drug trafficking or other surreptitious networks. First, we discuss 
quantitative network interdiction methods. Then, we introduce human-centric concepts 
used in social network analysis (SNA). Finally, we discuss techniques that draw from 
both areas and how our work either extends some of these concepts, or fills informational 
gaps in the research.  
A. QUANTITATIVE NETWORK ANALYSIS METHODS 
Quantitative counter-narcotics research in support of JIATF-S falls into two main 
categories: network interdiction and statistical analysis. Network interdiction methods 
may focus on either disrupting flow through a system or upon capturing a specific 
conveyance or load of a commodity as it moves through a system. Statistical methods 
focus on the latter only.  
1. Network Flow Problems 
Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) provide a thorough introduction to network 
flow theory and applications across a wide range of fields such as project management, 
transportation, telecommunications, and supply chain management. They suggest that 
network flow applications fall into any of three main types:  
 the shortest path problem, in which the goal is to identify how to most 
efficiently travel from one point to another;  
 the maximum flow problem, in which we wish to determine the maximum 
amount of a commodity that can get through a system given certain 
capacities; and  
 the minimum cost flow problem, in which resources or goods reside at 
various points in the network and need to be delivered to other points in 
the network in the least costly fashion. 
We will draw heavily on the two latter concepts. Additionally, whereas most 
simple network flow models assume that flow is conserved across every arc, we employ 
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the concept of generalized flow, which makes no such assumption and therefore allows 
for transmission loss or leakage.  
2. Attacker-Defender and Defender-Attacker Network Interdiction 
Models 
Wood (1993) describes an application of simple network interdiction (“max flow-
min cut”) to USSOUTHCOM counter-drug efforts in which a trafficker attempts to 
maximize flow through a capacitated network of rivers and roads while an interdictor 
attempts to minimize such flow by stopping flow on a certain number of arcs. Wood 
utilizes a set of rewards to “motivate” the trafficker to move through the system, a 
method we also employ.  
Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón, and Wood (2005) describe a two-sided attacker-
defender problem as a Stackelberg game in which two adversaries move sequentially in a 
leader and follower relationship. In this case, the attacker (leader) decides which nodes to 
interdict then the defender (follower), who observes this action, chooses the remaining 
least cost (or most beneficial) path or route to use. This type of model is appropriately 
used by an attacker seeking to disrupt the viability of a defender’s system or level of 
profits, which is central to this thesis. Conversely, a defender-attacker problem would 
reverse the sequencing such that the defender acts first and the attacker reacts to such 
action. This type of approach is useful for solving an optimal defense problem that 
identifies “the best possible defense given a limited defense budget (Brown et al. 2005).” 
The following is a general mathematical variation of the attacker-defender 
formulation described by Brown et al. In this case, the defender (also known as an 
operator) is the trafficker, and the attacker is the USG (and its international partners). The 
defender’s problem, more commonly known as the operator model, is 





where (i) y represents trafficker decisions, (ii) r defines the vector of rewards, (iii) c 
defines the vector of costs and/or penalties, and (iv) the set Y represents the constraints on 
the trafficking operation, such as arc capacities and transport assets available.  
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While the defender attempts to maximize net rewards, the attacker attempts to 
minimize this outcome. When the attacker moves first, followed by the defender’s 
response to that attack, this type of model is a min-max Stackelberg game. Therefore, the 
bilevel extension of the general formulation (1) applies an attacker variable subject to an 
attack budget and is represented as x X . The defender’s set of possible actions 
restricted by interdictions x is represented as Y(x). The attacker’s problem, MIN-MAX, is 
( )
min max( ) . (2)
x X y Y x
r c y    
Note that operator model (1) is the inner problem for attacker’s problem (2). As we seek 
insights into the trafficking problem and not necessarily the optimal solution, our 
formulation and approach (as described in Chapter III) primarily uses an extension of (1) 
with an enumeration of a range of results that may or may not capture the automated 
result that a full two-sided formulation might obtain. 
Brown et al. further describe even three-sided (or trilevel) defender-attacker-
defender applications to critical infrastructure defense, including how such planning is 
manifestly different from military applications when discussing the vulnerability of a 
commercial entity’s supply chain. Their supply chain example is analogous to our 
functional model, but differs in that efficiency is sought in a commercial supply chain in 
order to reduce cost, thus leaving the chain vulnerable to attack, whereas the trafficking 
model incorporates several redundancies due to the inherent risk of discovery and arrest.  
Introduced in Chapter I, several recent NPS theses present variations on the basic 
attacker-defender or defender-attacker approaches and focus exclusively upon detecting 
and interdicting a specific seaborne conveyance. Pfeiff (2009) combines a traditional 
defender-attacker model with platform-specific probabilities of detection of a SPSS in 
order to determine optimal placement of said search platforms. Gift (2010) considers an 
adaptive evader (trafficker) who learns of interdictor asset placement using different 
learning policies and measures the effect on attacker efficacy. Bessman (2010) also 
considers an adaptive evader, but in this case the evader reevaluates his remaining path 
options at each step along his way, taking into consideration knowledge obtained en 
route.  
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3. Statistical Approaches 
Another set of NPS theses apply statistical methods to improve ultimate 
counterdrug interdiction prospects, but are not network interdiction methods per se. In 
general, the following approaches consider the problem from a slightly different angle: 
that of how to optimize interdiction prospects by incorporating an intelligence or 
informational aspect into the model. Zlastin (2013) uses a Bayesian model to fuse 
together different types of incomplete data to reduce the uncertainty volume around the 
estimated current position of a particular trafficking target. Mooshegian (2013) uses 
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines developed by Pietz (2013) to determine 
probabilities of where a located target may next travel; essentially this is an advanced 
version of navigational dead-reckoning. Campos (2014) takes the output of this 
probability model as inputs into an optimization model in order to improve the chances of 
interdictor acquisition and prosecution of the target. 
Much of this and other network interdiction work focuses on the tactical or 
execution level, and addresses the actual trafficker’s modes of transportation and even 
specific conveyances. However, there appears to be a gap in research at the operational or 
strategic levels that consider how the trafficker actually manages or controls that 
particular mode of transportation, and at which level (tactical conveyance or operational-
strategic management) an interdiction may have more impactful results. 
B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Social network analysis is a more human-oriented methodology than the 
quantitative methods previously introduced. This is not to say, however, that SNA is 
purely non-quantitative. In fact, SNA shares with network flow theory many graph theory 
terms and concepts, and uses certain simple quantitative metrics.  
1. Traditional SNA Methods 
Degenne and Forsé (1999) describe classic social network analysis as a set of 
methods used to systematically study social structures—by focusing on understanding or 
discovering patterns of behavior, links or relationships, position, and power among and 
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between individuals within those social structures. These methods measure the extent to 
which an individual is connected to other individuals within a group (centrality). This 
may manifest itself in terms of how many connections an individual has to others (degree 
centrality), or the proportion of shortest paths between disparate third-party individuals 
that must pass through the individual of interest (betweenness centrality). They also 
expound upon the concept of flow betweenness, a type of centrality measure that uses 
flow—be it communication or resources—as the betweenness metric to determine 
important individuals in the network. While this last concept will be useful in this thesis, 
Degenne and Forsé make no mention of determining the importance of an individual in 
terms of what the social group is attempting to accomplish. 
Krackhardt (1998) explores the structural and dynamic differences between 
dyadic and triadic relationships first introduced by George Simmel. The dyad, a direct 
relationship between two people that can be characterized as either weak or strong, is the 
smallest form of network relationship. A dyad may be very strong as long as its two 
members mutually benefit, but it is also quite vulnerable since removing only one actor 
eliminates the entity. A dyad also affords either actor significant bargaining power within 
the relationship. A triad, on the other hand, has a different set of dynamics not simply 
due to the structural addition of a third entity. In a triad, the members have less individual 
leverage as any threat to leave the group results in a surviving dyad, which may be quite 
powerful compared to the individual. This leads to behavior and choices that help the 
group as a whole, rather than a single individual. This eventually helps mediate conflict 
within the group and can make it a much more stable and resilient structure than a dyad. 
Krackhardt further describes a coclique Simmelian tie in which “two people… are 
reciprocally and strongly tied to each other [as in a dyad] and… they are reciprocally and 
strongly tied to at least one third party in common (Krackhardt 1998).” Krackhardt shows 
that the Simmelian tie adds power and durability beyond that of a dyad and will last 
longer than other forms of ties. Thus, our pseudo trafficking social network has at its core 
a triad of cartel-level Mexican DTOs.  
Sparrow (1991) suggests that criminal intelligence analysis would benefit greatly 
from SNA techniques, and that traditional “lead-following” techniques are ultimately 
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ineffective. Sparrow quotes Lupsha (1980): “In terms of the war against organized crime, 
this approach has caused some analysts to wonder if individual-oriented prosecutions 
merely help to open the promotion ladder… while the group and the crime [activities] 
they engage in continues.” This bodes ominously for the current Operation MARTILLO 
implementation in which significant law enforcement time and effort is expended in 
“turning” captured low-level GFB or SPSS crew to gain information on a much larger 
narcotics network. Sparrow also highlights that “criminal network data is inevitably 
incomplete,” meaning that existent links or nodes will be unobserved, and he points out 
that little research had been accomplished to explore this issue up to that time. 
2. Enhancements to SNA 
W. Nesbitt (2006) helps to address this shortcoming in traditional SNA by 
introducing quantitative network-interdiction algorithms and then incorporating a set 
number of hidden arcs, which represent missing information, into the solution. Of note, 
one of the three example networks Nesbitt analyzed was an international smuggling 
network with a chain-like network structure.  
Erlacher (2013) combines SNA and the Special Operations Targeting Process 
(SOTP) to provide an improved methodology for “framing, describing, analyzing and 
proscribing solutions in complex social conflict environments.” He uses the CARVER 
(criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability) 
analysis method, whereupon the analyst makes value distinctions based upon mission 
intent, in order to better identify potential interdiction options. While Erlacher’s approach 
brings an operational focus to SNA, the value distinctions he references, however, are 
often subjective judgments; the overall approach remains focused on the existence or 
viability of the social group itself, not on what the group is attempting to achieve.  
C. COMBINED MODELS 
An extension of Sparrow’s suggestion of merging two different worlds to find 
synergies is the idea of combining two previously unrelated concepts into a single 
model—a social network and a project flow network, for instance—thus bringing what 
the social group is attempting to accomplish into consideration. P. Nesbitt (2012) first 
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applies this concept to a specific example of how to delay the development of an Iranian 
nuclear weapon, not by direct interdiction of the workflow process, but instead by 
interdiction of the manager and/or resources applied by those managers that facilitate the 
execution of that workflow. P. Nesbitt’s model, Adversarial Goal Interdiction (AGI), is a 
mixed integer linear program that explores attacker-defender interdictions against the 
social network nodes.  
We further expand upon P. Nesbitt’s work by applying a similar approach to the 
cocaine trafficking problem. Nesbitt’s nuclear weapon problem benefits from a functional 
model which is based on well-understood physics and engineering project information 
(e.g., the enrichment of uranium can be accomplished only so many ways and a ballistic 
missile must adhere to certain aerodynamic and guidance principles). While it also has a 
well-defined functional model, the cocaine trafficking problem presents more complexity 
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III. SOCIAL-FUNCTIONAL INTERDICTION MODELING 
This chapter first introduces the DTOSFNI model formulation, which is a 
parameterized operator model similar to formulation (1) from Chapter II that attempts to 
maximize trafficker profit. We then solve the attacker’s problem (2) through enumeration 
of one-, two-, and three-DTO interdiction options.  
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION SOCIAL-FUNCTIONAL 
NETWORK INTERDICTION MODEL FORMULATION 
The Drug Trafficking Organization Social-Functional Network Interdiction 
(DTOSFNI) model is a linear program representation of the conceptual SFNet. The 
trafficking enterprise seeks the optimum distribution of resources to maximize steady-
state monthly financial profit in the equivalent of millions of U.S. dollars (USD). It 
allows the enterprise to decide what types of resources to apply to which functional tasks, 
and whether or not to shift resources between DTOs. The model rewards the traffickers 
for moving an amount of cocaine to each successive level in the network, reflecting the 
increasing value of cocaine as it nears the U.S. market. The model also imposes costs to 
employ a given type of resource for a given task, as well as penalties for shifting 
resources between social entities and for attempting to move resources through, or apply 
resources from, an interdicted social node. The DTOSFNI formulation is now presented 





Subset of  representing arcs strictly between 





FA SFA SFA FN








Functional node (alias )
Social node (alias ' )
( , ) Arc directed from functional node  to functional node 




i j FA i j






 social-functional arc: ( , , )
Resource type representing a specific mode of transport
Breakpoint for  parameter







3. Parameters and Data 
, , Financial benefit of transporting cocaine from functional node  to
functional node  using social-functional arc  
[USD millions/metric ton of cocaine]








, , , ,
ional node  [metric tons/month]
Resource supply  available at social node 
Trust coefficient directed between social nodes  and '
Incremental cost to apply resource 
n r
n n






from social node  to social-
functional arc  between functional nodes  and  
[USD millions/unit]
Intercept of linear bounding function for given breakpoint  
based on the total re





sources applied to social-functional arc  
between functional nodes  and 
Slope of linear bounding function for given breakpoint  based 
on the total resources applied to social-functio




nal arc  between 
functional nodes  and 
Penalty for attempting to send resources through, or from, an 
interdicted social node [USD millions]




s friction resources between 
social nodes [USD millions]
ˆ Interdiction parameter; 





4. Decision Variables 
, , , ,
, ', ,
Apply resource  from social node  to social-functional arc  
between functional nodes  and 
_ Transfer of resource  from social node to social node '  via
social-functio
n i j a r
n n a r
RES r n a
i j
RES XFER r n n
, ,
nal arc 
Cocaine flow from functional node  to functional node  via 








, , , ,
( , , )
, , , , , , , ,
( , , , )
, , , , , , ,
( , , , ) ( , , )
, , ,







i j a i j a
i j a
FA
n i j a r n i j a r
n SN i j a r
SFA
n n i j a r n n a r
n SN i j a r n a r
SFA SA





s pen x RES RES XFER

















, , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, :
( , , , )
, , , ,














i j a i j a bp
i j a bp n i j a r
n r
i j a r
SFA
i j a j i a i
j a j a
FA i a FA





slope RES i j a FA bp



















', , , ,
( , ):
, ,
, , , , ,










n i j a r n r
i j a
i j a r
SFA
t RES XFER














, , , ,
, , ,
0 , , (7)
0 , , , ,
_ 0 , ', ,
i j a
n i j a r n
n n a r
FLOW i j a FA
RES n SN i j a r FA
RES XFER n n a r SA
  
   
    
 
6. Discussion 
The objective function (3) assesses profit, which breaks into an additive reward 
component based on amount of cocaine moved, and detractive cost and penalty 
components based on the actual and/or attempted application or transfer of resources. 
Each resource contribution constraint (4) limits the maximum FLOW capacity on a given 
functional arc FA. Each balance-of-flow constraint (5) ensures that, given a supply of 
cocaine is available from a predecessor functional node and sufficient resources are 
applied to move that cocaine to a successor functional node, the commodity will flow 
through the functional network. Each balance-of-resource-flow constraint (6) limits the 
amount of resources a particular DTO can apply to functional tasks to the sum of its 
initial resource supply and any flow it receives from other DTOs, less what it transfers to 
any other DTO. The trustn,n′ coefficient described in Chapter I directly affects this 
constraint and restricts the unfettered flow of assets throughout the social network. 
Domain restrictions (7) list all non-negativity constraints for the decision variables. 
We approximate each resource-dependent FNet arc capacity by a concave 
piecewise linear function of the resources applied as shown in Figure 12. Each capacity 
function is specified by three values, one at each of three (non-zero) “breakpoints” at 
which the slope changes; at the origin, zero resources are applied and there is zero 
capacity, which gives us a fourth breakpoint. From these breakpoint-value pairs we 
derive the slopes and y-intercepts that define the three linear functions that bound the 




Figure 12.  Piecewise-Linear Capacity Function for a  
Typical Functional Network Arc 
Each red dashed line is an upper bound on the capacity. Note that bp3 also denotes the 
upper resource limit. Together, the constraints derived from these bounds result in a 
linear program and a feasible region for allowable cocaine flow across that particular 
FNet arc. Detailed capacity function data for each resource type and FNet arc, as well as 
an applied example of this chart, can be found in Appendix A. 
B. ENUMERATION OF ATTACKER INTERDICTIONS 
We input the DTOSFNI model and data into the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS 2015). Due to the relatively small size of the social network (only nine 
nodes) it is possible to parameterize the interdiction options using a one-sided approach. 
Since the main purpose of this application of the DTOSFNI model is to aid with 
developing insights into the trafficking problem, and we are not necessarily looking for 
the best attack plan (such as by the employment of a two-sided attacker-defender model), 
but rather a set of relatively better attack plans that may differ on how well they perform 
with respect to two metrics: total trafficker reward (explicit to the model) and how much 
additional overt action by DTO-G a set of interdictions causes with the intent of gathering 
evidence on DTO-G (a corollary output of the model).  
Even with our relatively small social network of nine nodes, complete 
enumeration of all attacks becomes cumbersome quite rapidly, especially if one attempts 
to do this manually. Limiting ourselves to only one interdicted node yields nine possible 
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options. If we interdict any two nodes, we have 36 possible combinations. There are 84 
possible combinations of any three nodes. We use an upper limit of three simultaneous or 
closely-sequenced attacks, not because it is computationally demanding, but because we 
assume this scenario approaches the maximum capacity of the U.S. counterdrug 
community. Our enumeration approach follows: 
1. Zero interdictions: determine baseline profit and DTO-G activity level 
results. 
2. Single interdictions: determine profit reduction and DTO-G activity level 
results for individually interdicting DTO-A through -I. 
3. Dual interdictions: determine profit reduction and DTO-G activity level 
results for all pairs of DTOs, such as AB, AC, AD, … , HI. 
4. Triple interdictions: determine profit reduction results for all triplets of 
DTOs, such as ABC, ABD, ABE, … , GHI. 
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IV. DATA, RESULTS, AND ANALYSES 
This chapter begins with a review of the hypothetical data—as well as methods 
and/or assumptions made in its development—used in this instance of the trafficking 
problem. This is followed by a review of the results and the chapter concludes with 
analyses of the results. 
A. HYPOTHETICAL DATA AND DEVELOPMENT 
Developing hypothetical data that approximates realistic data may be almost as 
difficult as obtaining real-world data from the outset; however, a methodical approach 
that begins with “known” data and uses certain intermediate assumptions to derive 
“unknown” data helps ensure the data instance makes sense. Such an approach is also 
extremely powerful when “perfect” adversary information is not available, which is 
inevitably the case with incomplete friendly information or knowledge of TOCs.  
We begin our data development by exploiting the geo-physical limitations of 
cocaine trafficking in the functional network. Because we are dealing with a physical 
commodity (i.e., cocaine)—with limited sources and sinks—and physical means of 
transport, there are limited variations of the process of moving cocaine to the United 
States. This physical milieu also effectively channelizes any social entities who wish to 
enable and/or profit from the transport and eventual sale of cocaine. By exploiting these 
known geo-physical limitations, we can apply reasonable assumptions with respect to the 
capacities of the various modes of transport in order to determine a bound on the upper 
limit of what is possible (i.e., the maximum hypothetical throughput of cocaine) in a non-
interdicted base case.  
We then use an iterative approach to develop the resource data, by selecting initial 
resources values, running a maximum flow variation of the DTOSFNI model on 
subsequently larger subsets of the FNet (beginning with intra-Colombia transit and 
expanding from there), and observing the results. Any anomalies observed (such as 
inadequate cocaine supply movement, over- or under-involvement of a particular DTO, 
etc.) inform the potential need for modifications to the initial data choices. A similar 
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approach also informs the choice of behavior parameters, cost modifiers used to obtain 
appropriate DTO levels of activity in certain parts of the FNet.  
Each of the following sections provides an overview of the main data and 
assumptions used in this instance of the trafficker problem. Detailed data can be found in 
Appendix A.  
1. Functional Network Cocaine Data and Assumptions 
We begin the FNet data development from the “known” ONDCP annual cocaine 
production estimate of 633t from Chapter I, converting it to an aggregated steady-state 
monthly supply of 53t. For consistency within the model, we assume all weights are for 
pure, uncut cocaine. We also assume all production is US-bound and transit is 
geographically limited to Central America and Mexico. According to ONDCP estimates, 
the trafficking via the EPAC vector far outpaces that in the WCARIB vector (refer to 
Figure 1 in Chapter I). We estimated supplies of 34.5t and 18.5t for the Pacific source 
and the Caribbean source, respectively, as shown in Table 3 using a least squares 
approximation to known ONDCP data points for the mix of conveyances and their 
capacities.  
Table 3.   Functional Network Steady-State Monthly Supply Data 
Source Node Supply (tonnes) Data Type 
Colombia Pacific Source 34.5 Derived 
Colombia Caribbean Source 18.5 Derived 
Total 53.0 Known 
The 53.0t per month steady-state production approximates the ONDCP annual production 
estimate of 633t. We also assume all production is US-bound and transit is 
geographically limited to Central America and Mexico. We use a least squares 
approximation to current ONDCP estimates for the mix of trafficking conveyances and 
their observed capacities, to derive the monthly supply from each of the FNet source 
zones. 
Without a feedback arc that connects the functional network sink to the sources, 
as in a traditional maximum flow model, we need a mechanism to “motivate” the cocaine 
to move throughout the network. This is accomplished by using rewards for every unit of 
cocaine the traffickers deliver to subsequent nodes in the functional model. Shown in 
 45
Table 4 are the rewards used, which approximate the increasing value of cocaine as it 
nears the U.S. retail market. When combined with total tonnage moved into a zone, this 
provides gross revenue earned by the traffickers. The difference in market value for any 
FNet arc is the “marginal” value provided by moving cocaine from one endpoint to the 
other across that particular arc. These marginal values become the rewardi,j,a coefficients 
used in the objective function of the DTOSFNI model. 









Source 0 0 
South America Coast 5 5 
Central America 10 5 
Southern Mexico 12 2 
Northern Mexico 16 4 
U.S. Side of U.S.-Mexico Border 25 9 
U.S. Sink 100 75 
Data adapted from Stewart (2013) Mexico’s Cartels and the Economics of Cocaine. 
Stratfor Security Weekly (January 3), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-cartels-
and-economics-cocaine. The U.S. Sink zone value reflects the retail street price. All other 
values reflect the wholesale price for a given zone. This set of rewards acts as a 
mechanism to induce cocaine movement through the FNet. 
There also exist certain costs in the FNet that depend on the mode of transport 
used, where that mode is employed geographically, and on the distance that must be 
covered over the course of a round trip. In general, there are two parts of the modal cost 
per unit employed: a fixed cost that includes special operator pay (such as for pilots), and 
a variable cost that includes O&M (per mile) as well as an amortized acquisition cost. In 
the case of the SPSS, each vessel is expected to make a single one-way trip, so the 
amortized cost is the per-unit construction cost of $1 million. The costs used in this 
instance are not intended to be exact costs, but rather represent relative orders of 
magnitude of cost differences between various transit options. A sample of such costs is 
shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Sample Functional Network Modal Costs 















Colombia to CENTAM; 
EPAC Vector 
$60,000 



















Truck CENTAM None $0.70 $0.70 





Shown are a sample of costs used in this model. Each mode has a fixed cost per round 
trip, which usually consists of a special crew pay. This amount varies by mode and 
location, but is generally higher for high-risk missions and if there is a special skill 
required (such as piloting an aircraft). In the case of the SPSS, the fixed cost is the cost of 
construction and operation since it is a single-use asset. In the case of the truck in Central 
America, there is no shortage of drivers and the risk of interception by authorities is low, 
hence the extra pay is zero. Crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, however, involves 
increased risk, so an extra bonus is used. Each mode also has a variable cost per mile, 
which consists of fuel and maintenance costs, as well as amortization of acquisition costs. 
Also shown for comparison purposes only is the total cost per round trip mile. Complete 
mode and SFNet arc-specific costs are provided in Appendix A. 
2. Social Network Resource Data and Assumptions 
Now that we have informed estimates for the total cocaine production and recent 
historical conveyance patterns, we can make certain transport assumptions to derive 
steady-state resource allocations for our notional DTOs. First, we need to assign each 
DTO a role and a mindset as in Table 2 in Chapter I (reproduced here as Table 6). These 
roles help inform where in the FNet a given DTO operates and can also provide guidance 
on relative resources a DTO possesses (e.g., a Mexican cartel DTO generally has more 
resources than an intermediate-level DTO). The mindsets help inform the asset mix for a 
given DTO, while also influencing where in the FNet a given DTO prefers to assign its 
resources.  
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Table 6.   DTO Roles and Mindsets (Replication of Table 2) 
DTO Role(s) Mindset 
A Source Transit Primary focus on transport via the EPAC vector.  
B Source Transit Primary focus on transport via the WCARIB vector, 
with lesser focus on the EPAC vector. Uses some 
aircraft. 
C Intermediate Transit Primary focus on transit through Central America and 
Mexico via a mix of ground-based and airborne modes. 
D Intermediate Transit, 
Money Laundering 
Ships exclusively via aircraft. 
E Cartel Leadership Vertically integrated; most active cartel DTO along 
entire trafficking pipeline.  
F Intermediate Transit Owns air cargo company and trucking company. 
G Cartel Leadership Highly security conscious and prefers to operate 
behind-the-scenes with minimal overt activity. High 
U.S. political desire to interdict this DTO. 
H Cartel Leadership Primary focus on importation. Significant use of cross-
border tunnels from Mexico to US.  
I Intermediate Transit Ships exclusively via its own trucking company. 
A DTO’s role is an indicator of its association to the FNet geography and of its 
resourcing level relative to other DTOs, while a DTO’s mindset is an indicator of how it 
prefers to operate. As an example, a Source Transit DTO generally operates close to 
Colombia, while the mindsets shown indicate in which vector a given Source Zone DTO 
will usually operate. Some DTOs are strictly surface-based (DTO-A and DTO-I), while 
others have a mix of air and surface assets (DTO-F). These distinctions help guide the 
development of the resource allocations in Table 8. 
In order for the DTOSFNI model to incorporate these DTO mindsets, we use a set 
of DTO behavior parameters to obtain results that affect the willingness of a particular 
DTO to apply resources to a particular functional node. This willingness is captured as a 
behavior parameter and is developed using the iterative maximum flow approach 
previously described (Table 7). For instance, DTO-A is able to apply truck resources to 
both the EPAC and WCARIB supply routes in Colombia, but according to Table 6, it is 
more preferable for it to operate in the EPAC as it generates more net profit potential for 
that DTO due to follow-on supply chain control. In Table 7, this behavior is obtained by 
making it 30% more costly for DTO-A to apply truck resources to the WCARIB vector. 
This also allows DTO-A to use the WCARIB routes if absolutely necessary (e.g., if 
DTO-B is interdicted).  
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Table 7.   DTO Behavior Parameters 
Parameter Value  Description/Rationale 
s_A_truck 1.3 Cost multiplier for DTO-A to use trucks for Caribbean transit 
due to preference for Pacific vector. 
s_B_truck 1.1 Cost multiplier for DTO-B to use trucks for Pacific transit due 
to preference for Caribbean vector. 
s_B_gfb 1.1 Cost multiplier for DTO-B to use GFBs in the Pacific vector 
due to preference for Caribbean vector. 
s_G_ground 1.5 Cost multiplier for DTO-G to directly support functional flow 
due to preference for security and reduced exposure. 
s_G_air 1.25 Cost multiplier for DTO-G to directly support functional flow 
due to preference for security and reduced exposure. 
All listed parameters are used only for data preprocessing and are not part of the actual 
model formulation. Without these parameters, the arc-specific cost would apply equally 
to all DTOs and may cause certain undesired model behavior (such as DTO-G always 
acting overtly). Extending the DTO-G example, we want the cost for it to directly 
resource the FNet to be so expensive that it prefers to supply other DTOs first via SNet 
transfers, and only becomes directly involved when it is not feasible to do otherwise. The 
use of a cost-based penalty is an appropriate mechanism for controlling DTO behavior in 
the model as it allows the model to react dynamically, as opposed to using fixed 
constraints, which may be more cumbersome to employ and may only elicit the desired 
behavior across a limited set of circumstances. 
Since the actual number of vehicles or assets utilized by a particular DTO is not 
available via open source channels, we again start with the known and make some 
assumptions about the unknown. We know the amount of cocaine that needs to be moved 
and we know its starting locations. By using our mindset assumptions (as well as 
assumptions about which DTOs are active in which FNet tasks) we can systematically 
and iteratively move the complete cocaine supply of 53t closer to the U.S. homeland, 
beginning in South America, and transiting Central America and Mexico. We describe 
one particular example of this iterative process in the following paragraphs.  
For instance, there are two main DTOs (A and B) that move cocaine out of South 
America by GFB and/or SPSS. Since only a small amount of cocaine leaves Colombia 
via airplane (roughly 10% per Figure 1 in Chapter I), it is safe to assume that the 
remainder must be moved to the Colombian coastline from the cultivation and production 
sources. We assume that all intra-Colombian transport occurs via commercial-type 
trucks. Using assumptions for speed (25 miles per hour), distance to travel (175-250 
miles), on-load and off-load times (two hours each), and return time, we can derive the 
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total time for a single roundtrip along a given functional arc. Depending on assumptions 
regarding truck turnaround or idle time (for maintenance or driver rest, etc.), in this 
instance a roundtrip would take about 24-48 hours. Using this approach we derive that 
one truck can make a maximum of 15-30 roundtrips per month. This assumes a 
continuous operation, however, which may be detrimental to maintaining secrecy and 
risks alerting the authorities. Therefore, a judgment call limits the number of allowable 
roundtrips per truck in Colombia to six.  
Using capacity estimates derived using the capacity function described in Chapter 
III, we can now make an estimate of the number of trucks needed to move the entire 
ground-based supply of cocaine within Colombia and allocate them to DTO-A and -B 
according to what we assume to be their existent follow-on capacity. DTO-A focuses on 
the Pacific source and utilizes SPSS, while DTO-B focuses on the Caribbean source and 
relies more heavily on smaller GFBs. Hence, DTO-A has a greater demand for 
throughput from the source zones and ability to move more cocaine using maritime 
means, so we make a judgment call to allocate more trucks to DTO-A than to DTO-B.  
In most cases, we tested the initial resource estimates by running the maximum 
flow model to ensure that all cocaine was moved into a given node “zone.” Then the 
model was run to obtain resource estimates for the subsequent zone, which may or may 
not affect the resources required in the previous zone. As more zones received the total 
supply, the resource requirements were assessed to ensure they remained plausible and 
within the assumed mix of transport modes. Once the complete supply reached the 
destination (sink) node the maximum flow model was used to assess reductions in 
resources to “break” the models ability to move the entire source supply to the sink. The 
intent was to come up with a relatively lean steady-state trafficking instance in which 
there were few, if any, slack (e.g., reserve) resources.  
The result of this iterative derivation process is shown in Table 8. With the 
exception of some aircraft, the only slack in resources exists with DTO-G, the low-key, 
behind-the-scenes entity.  
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Table 8.   Social Network Steady-State Resource Supply Data 









A  8  1  1 8   
B  4 2 (1)   1 4  
C 10  6 0 3     
D   6 2      
E  30 1 0  1 2 2  
F  20 3 (1) (2)  1    
G (20) (20) (5) (5) (3)    1+1 
H 10 26 0 0 1    3 
I  25        
Cell values indicate steady-state (non-interdicted) resource supplies at each DTO node. 
Values in parentheses indicate reserve (unused) supply at a given DTO node. Zeros 
indicate that a given DTO could apply a given resource to the functional model if a 
resource transfer occurs. Blank cells indicate that a given DTO cannot apply a particular 
resource, even if a transfer occurs. DTO-G has a single tunnel in steady-state, but may 
assume control of one of the DTO-H tunnels if the latter is interdicted. This tunnel is 
represented by the s_G_tunnel parameter in our DTOSFNI GAMS code. 
As discussed in Chapter I, the DTOs in the SNet are able to transfer resources to 
each other and that a trust coefficient determines SNet arc capacities for resources that 
can physically or logistically be transferred between DTOs (Table 8). In the steady-state, 
non-interdicted base case, no transfer occurs. This models the assumption that each DTO 
has the resources immediately at hand in order to move all the cocaine supply it receives. 
Certain coefficients are relatively high (≥0.8), especially for the money-laundering DTO-
D, and between the core Mexican cartel triad (E, G, and H). The values provided by 
Table 9, while arbitrary, represent a simple mechanism for modeling physical 
cooperation or even distrust between DTOs.  
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Table 9.   Matrix of Social Network Trust Coefficients 
Arc 
Trust 
To Social DTO Node 











e A 1 0 0.7 0.9 0 0.6 0 0 0 
B 0 1 0.7 0.9 0 0.7 0 0 0 
C 0.6 0.6 1 0.9 0.6 0 1 0.6 0 
D 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
E 0 0 0.7 0.9 1 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 
F 0.5 0.5 0 0.9 0.6 1 0.7 0.6 0 
G 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.5 1 0.8 0.5 
H 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.8 1 0 
I 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 0 0.7 0 1 
These trust coefficients determine the willingness of one DTO to transfer or share 
resources with another DTO if the enterprise is attacked and are not required to be 
symmetrical. Due to personalities or prior experiences, one DTO may actually trust 
another DTO more so than in the reverse case. One such example is the AD/DA 
relationship in which DTO-A trusts DTO-D (coefficient of 0.9) more so than DTO-D 
trusts DTO-A (coefficient of 0.8). 
3. Social-Functional Network Data and Assumptions 
The remaining data and assumptions describe the connection of the SNet to the 
FNet. Table 10 is a list of resource-specific FNet arcs that connect geographic sub-nodes 
for each FNet node.  
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Table 10.   Functional Network Arc List 
FNet Arc 
ID FNet Node From To Mode 
1_1 Colombia Transit  (Pac) SA_Source_Pac SA_Coast_Pac Truck 
1_2 Trans-Colombia Transit SA_Source_Carib SA_Coast_Pac Plane_Sngl 
2_1 Colombia Transit  (Carib) SA_Source_Carib SA_Coast_Carib Truck 
2_2 Trans-Colombia Transit SA_Source_Pac SA_Coast_Carib Plane_Sngl 
3_1 Direct Air Transit SA_Source_Pac CA_Trans Plane_Twin 3_2 SA_Source_Carib CA_Trans Plane_Twin 
3_3 Pac GFB Transit SA_Coast_Pac CA_Trans GFB_Long 
3_4 Pac SPSS Transit SA_Coast_Pac CA_Trans SPSS 
3_5 Carib GFB Transit SA_Coast_Carib CA_Trans GFB_Short 
4_1 
CENTAM Transit 
CA_Trans Mex_Trans Truck 
4_2 CA_Trans Mex_Trans Plane_Sngl 
4_3 CA_Trans Mex_Trans Plane_Twin 
5_1 
Mexico Transit 
Mex_Trans Mex_Border Truck 
5_2 Mex_Trans Mex_Border Plane_Sngl 
5_3 Mex_Trans Mex_Border Plane_Twin 
6_1 Import Tunnel Mex_Border US_Border Tunnel 
7_1 Import Air Mex_Border US_Border_UL Plane_UL 
8_1 Import Ground,  
Transit to Sink 
Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 
8_2 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 
8_3 Import Air Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Plane_Sngl 8_4 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Plane_Twin 
8_5 
Transit to Sink 
US_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 
8_6 US_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 
8_7 US_Border_UL US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 
8_8 US_Border_UL US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 
These FNet arc IDs are used as short aliases for the long FROM-TO names in the FNet 
split-nodes. The FNet arcs are generally grouped by the location to which cocaine is 
being supplied. The first digit in the FNet arc ID indicates this grouping, while the second 
digit in the ID is used to distinguish the applicable mode of transport. This prevents 
impermissible assignments, such as using a GFB on a land-based transport function. 
The connections, or arcs, from the SNet nodes to the FNet arcs are represented by 
a matrix of binary values (Table 11). Note that while a connection may exist from a DTO 
to a resource-specific FNet arc, this does not imply that the DTO has sufficient resources 
to apply to that arc. It only indicates an ability to apply available resources. 
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Table 11.   Social Network to Functional Network Arc Matrix 
A value of 1 indicates that a given DTO can apply a particular resource to the given 
resource-specific FNet arc. Blank cells indicate that a given DTO has no ability to apply a 
resource to the given FNet arc. 
B. MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
The enumerated results of the DTOSFNI model runs are presented in this section. 
We are interested primarily in the percent reduction in the objective value (monthly 
“profit” in USD) from the base case, with a secondary goal of drawing DTO-G into the 
open in order to increase evidence-gathering opportunities against it. The first three sub-
sections are divided according to the number of interdicted SNet nodes used in the attack 
plan and discuss results with respect to the primary goal. The fourth sub-section discusses 
results with respect to the secondary goal, which also provides some insight into why the 
primary goal results appear as they do. Highlights of the results are shown in this section; 
complete results are available in Appendix B. 
1. Analysis of One-DTO Attack Plans 
This section considers the case when one DTO is interdicted or removed from the 
SFNet. There are nine DTOs in our social network, and so there are nine possible attack 
plans plus the base un-interdicted case. The base case yields a trafficker “profit” of 
$5,289.65 million. The enumerated attack results are shown in Figure 13 as a percentage 
reduction from the base case trafficker profit.  



















































A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1     
G          1   1   1 1 1 1 1   
H             1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I             1 1 1 1 1 1      
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Figure 13.  One-DTO Attack Plan Results 
The results clearly show that interdicting either of the two source zone DTOs (A or B) or 
the highly involved cartel leader (E) yields the most favorable results with respect to the 
primary goal of reducing trafficker profit. Attacking DTO-A achieves the greatest 
reduction in profit, while attacking DTO-B or -E yields a clear second tier of attack 
options. An attack on DTO-H allows the traffickers to gain rewards on most of the 
cocaine flow until just short of the U.S. border. Surprisingly, an attack on DTO-F is not 
very lucrative, even though this removes one SPSS from the resource supply. Attacking 
DTO-G has little effect, though this is expected since it is not active in the system in the 
non-interdicted case. Of note, DTO-C, -I, and -D are smaller organizations that focus on 
only one or two modes of transportation. This focused characteristic may indicate that 
any loss of their resources may be easily offset by the multi-modal capacities of the other 
DTOs.  
It is clear that attacking DTO-A provides the largest reduction in trafficking profit 
by a significant margin, which is expected due to its high throughput from the source 
zone. Attacking DTOs B or E provides lower, similar reductions, while attacking H or F 
yields correspondingly lower reductions. Each of these five attack plans achieves profit 
reduction primarily through limiting the flow of cocaine itself. There is also a 
compounding effect of cutting off flow earlier in the supply chain as later rewards are not 
gained. Attacking DTOs A, B, or E prevent a large amount cocaine from even reaching 
Central America, as does attacking DTO-F to a much smaller extent. Attacking DTO-H 
achieves all of its reduction at the U.S. border through the net removal of two tunnels.  
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Attacking any of the remaining DTOs (C, D, I, and G) yields very little reduction 
in trafficking profit, most which is achieved by shifting the cocaine flow to more costly 
modes and/or routes, rather than by reducing it altogether.  
2. Analysis of Two-DTO Attack Plans 
This section considers the case when two DTOs are simultaneously (or near-
simultaneously) interdicted or removed from the SFNet. The results for the dual attacks 
that provide marginal improvement over the individual attacks on either sub-component 
are shown (along with the single attacks for comparison purposes) in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Combined One-DTO and Marginally Effective  
Two-DTO Attack Plan Results  
Only dual attack plans that provide marginal benefit over single attacks on its sub-
components are shown here. The AB attack plan yields the greatest reduction in profit, 
primarily due to the fact that Colombia production sources are almost completely isolated 
from the rest of the supply chain by the lack of any truck assets to move cocaine from 
production areas to the Colombian coastline. An AE combination yields the second best 
results and can decrease cocaine profits by almost 50%. Especially noteworthy is the fact 
that several dual attack plans are no more beneficial than the top three single attack plans 
(A, B, or E). While combinations of attacks on DTO-A, DTO-B, or DTO-E present in the 
top six results are not unexpected given the single attack results, what is interesting is the 
GH attack that ranks third. 
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It is clear from these results that the best attack options all include some 
combination of A, B, E, or F (two source zone DTOs, a cartel-level DTO, and an 
intermediate DTO), the last of which was not obvious from the single attack plan results. 
Geography of our network can help explain some of these outcomes as the restriction of 
cocaine flow occurs early in the supply chain. The AB attack essentially isolates the 
cultivation and production zones in Colombia from the maritime routes, leaving only 
risky, expensive air routes available to the surviving DTOs. Such an attack may be 
infeasible in the real world as there are numerous Colombian and maritime-based DTOs 
and it would be difficult to take most or all of them down. However, pairing a source 
zone DTO with a vertically-integrated DTO (such as E or F) that operates in the maritime 
region between Colombia and CENTAM and further moves cocaine through CENTAM 
and Mexico appears to yield good results. Of these types of attack plans, the AE attack 
performs the best, followed by AF, as each removes 2/3 of the SPSSs from the base case.  
While these results imply that each of the better dual attack plans will include at 
least one of the better single attack plans, there is no guarantee that this will be the case. 
The results also show that simply attacking any two DTOs is also not guaranteed to be 
any better than attacking a single DTO (see Table 12). The 3rd-best ranking of the GH 
attack in Figure 14 indicates that other variables may have a synergistic effect (in this 
case such an attack removes all tunnels as a resource) and that attacks on two previously 
inconsequential DTOs may have an outsized effect if combined. Another important 
observation is that, other than the GH attack, attacking two Mexican cartel-level DTOs 
provided no better results than attacking DTO-E alone.  
Table 12.   Marginally Ineffective Two-DTO Attack Plans 
AC AH BD BI DE EG 
AD AI BG CE DI EI 
AG BC BH CI EH FI 
These attack plans provide either fractional (<0.1%) or no additional benefit over a single 
attack on one of its components. In most cases, the beneficial single attack is A, B, or E. 
Plans C, D, and I proved unfruitful in the single attack results and provide no added value 
when combined with A, B, or E. It is noteworthy to see that the EG and the EH attacks 
have no benefit over a single E attack although each comprise 2/3 of the Mexican cartel 
leadership triad. 
 57
3. Analysis of Three-DTO Attack Plans 
This section considers the case when three DTOs are interdicted or removed from 
the SFNet. While we actually enumerate all 84 triple attack plans in the full results shown 
in Appendix B, we first focus on adding a third attack to each of the top seven dual 
attacks to observe any nested results, and then consider additional attack options. All 
marginally effective triple attack options that yield greater profit reductions than a single 
E attack are shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Combined One-DTO and Marginally Effective  
Two-DTO and Three-DTO Attack Plan Results  
Only triple attacks that provide a marginal benefit over the maximum underlying single 
attack or dual attack component, and perform better than a single attack on DTO-E, are 
shown here. Note that the AB attack plan still yields the greatest reduction in profit, and 
any third attack that extends this dual attack will provide zero added benefit. Rather than 
exploiting one of the expected DTOs from the single attacks (A, B, or E), the surprisingly 
well-performing dual GH attack is most improved upon by attacking the previously 
inconsequential DTO-C.  
As with the Two-DTO attacks, there are several Three-DTO attack plans that do 
not perform as well as the better single or dual attack plans. This is further evidence that 
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simply adding attacks indiscriminately does not guarantee better results than attack plans 
with fewer interdicted DTOs. 
Just as the Two-DTO attack plans produced a surprising 3rd-best result for a GH 
attack, the Three-DTO attack results begin to show interesting interactions (or lack 
thereof) as more of the network is interdicted. It is clear that no third attack option can 
improve upon the dual AB attack. If we omit that option, however, we observe that the 
previously 6th-best dual attack (EF) provides a better basis upon which to build third 
attack options than AE (2nd-best), GH (3rd-best), AF (4th-best), and BE (5th-best). We also 
see previously inconsequential DTOs becoming keys to attacking the trafficking network. 
For instance, note that the new 2nd-best overall attack plan combines EF with G, a point 
which is explored further in the next section. Also, the best augmentation to a dual GH 
attack is not to attack one of the “usual suspects” (A, B, or E), but rather to include DTO-
C instead. 
While no third attack can improve upon the dual AB attack plan, we observe two 
triple attack options that exceed a 60% reduction: EFG and AEF. The EFG attack plan 
effectively cuts out 2/3 of the base case SPSSs while preventing reserve resources from 
being applied. The AEF attack plan cuts out all SPSSs from the network, but this is 
partially offset by the availability of DTO-G reserves. These two attacks plans are also 
the only Three-DTO attack plans that dominate any Two-DTO attack plan, with the 
exception of AB. 
Also noteworthy is that attacking all three Mexican Cartel DTOs (EGH) provides 
only middling results. That may indicate that the enterprise can likely survive the 
simultaneous loss of all three, and perhaps afford one or more of the remaining DTOs an 
opportunity to “promote” and fill this void. 
4. When Evidence-Gathering Against DTO-G is Desired 
We may also use our DTOSFNI results to evaluate how a particular attack plan 
forces the surreptitious DTO-G to become more active in the network under the 
hypothesis that this will lead to increase evidence-gathering opportunities for law 
enforcement. (Note that this same approach can be used to select attack plans to avoid 
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causing a DTO to become more active.)  For this example, while any range of metrics 
that consider SNet resource transfers or capacity added to the functional network are 
valid, our metric is a relatively simple summation of all assets that DTO-G must apply 
directly to the functional network under a given attack plan scenario. Scatterplots of the 
primary objective (profit reduction explicit in the DTOSFNI model) versus this 
secondary objective (increased activity as a consequential output from the model) may 
actually help explain some of the unexpected results shown in the previous sections. First 
we consider the One-DTO interdiction results (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16.  Evidence-Gathering Results for One-DTO Attack Plans 
These results clearly show that interdicting either of the two source zone DTOs (A or B) 
or the highly involved cartel leader (E) yields the most favorable results with respect to 
the primary goal of reducing profit. Attack plans that focus on the secondary goal of 
forcing DTO-G to become more overt yield little to no reduction in trafficking profit, 
with the H attack plan forcing DTO-G to be the most active.  
The goal of minimizing the traffickers’ profit initially appears to be at odds with 
an evidence-gathering strategy. If we can execute a single attack, and no more, then we 
would attack the highest yielding DTO in terms of profit reduction and be done with it. 
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Analyzing corollary results, however, is extremely useful in attempting to determine how 
a trafficking network may react to a given attack, and can help law enforcement 
anticipate the adversary’s response. The key here is that even if the model returns a 
response that ultimately does not come to fruition, this fact actually tells us something 
that we did not previously know about the traffickers’ network, whether it be that a 
previously unobserved actor is now active (similar to an unobserved DTO-G, for 
instance) or that the DTOs have a different set of resources available to them. This 
approach can also be useful when determining how to stimulate the network in order for 
the traffickers to reveal themselves or make a more exploitable mistake. “Priority” targets 
for a particular type of attack plan (i.e., a single attack) may not actually be priority 
targets for a given dual attack plan, as shown in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17.  Marginal Improvement when DTO-G Added as Second Attack 
The marginal improvement over a given single attack plan when DTO-G is added as a 
second attack is shown here. As indicated by Figure 14, the H attack plan yields the most 
DTO-G activity. Subsequently attacking DTO-G in addition to the original DTO-H attack 
yields an extra 32.7% reduction in trafficker profit. The A and B attack plans reduce the 
need for DTO-G activity, so it is to be expected that DTO-G provides no better when 
added to either single attack. The only surprising results are the increase gained when 
augmenting a single D attack (0 increase in DTO-G activity), and the lack of benefit 
when augmenting a single E attack.  
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Next, we consider how Two-DTO attack plans affect DTO-G activity and how 
this may affect our Three-DTO attack decisions (Figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 18.  Evidence-Gathering Results for Two-DTO Attack Plans 
This plot looks very similar to that in Figure 16. The upper left dual AB attack builds 
from the single A attack, while the dual EF attack improves upon the single E attack. 
Dual attack based on the single H attack are generally found in the lower-right of the plot. 
This lower-right portion of the graph also has a few I-based attacks and a CF attack. This 
leads us to consider EF and the group of dual attacks in the lower-right as potential 
candidates for more lucrative triple attacks adding DTO-G. 
We can observe from Figure 18 a few items of interest. First, one could determine 
there are roughly five major clusters of results:  
1. those that reduce or effect little change in DTO-G activity and have a wide 
range in profit reduction, 
2. those that increase DTO-G activity slightly (6-13 assets), with a low level 
of profit reduction, 
3. those that increase DTO-G activity a moderate amount (18-20 assets) but 
have almost no profit reduction,  
4. the EF result that shows a moderate DTO-G activity increase, but has 
significant profit reduction as well, and  
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5. those that maximize DTO-G activity (30-41 assets), but have little 
reduction in profit (less than 15%).  
Second, we can use this information to narrow our candidate list of triple attacks to 
evaluate if computational run time is of concern (say for real-world applications with 
networks that are much more detailed and complex). While we do enumerate all 84 triple 
attack plans, we present our results here in terms of attack plan EF and those in the fifth 
cluster. We also include results for attack plans AB, AE, BH, and AH in order to show 
how select “non-sampled” results rank (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 19.  Marginal Improvement when DTO-G Added as Third Attack 
The marginal improvement over a given dual attack plan (selected from the clusters in 
Figure 18) when DTO-G is added as a third attack is shown here. Attack plans marked 
with an asterisk do provide significant marginal benefit, but would not have been selected 
for further evaluation if the cluster prioritization approach were to have been used. Unlike 
the relatively predictable results in Figure 17, using the scatterplot approach in this 
instance is not as predictive in determining potential lucrative attack combinations. While 
every attack plan in the fifth cluster does lead to further reductions if DTO-G were to also 
be attacked, there does not appear to be a clear hierarchy that may be discerned (e.g. 
more DTO-G asset exposure leads to greater benefit if DTO-G is subsequently attacked). 
The group of attacks that include DTO-H appears to correspond to the GH_ group of 
attacks in Figure 15. The clear outperformance of the EF attack plan, which has only a 
moderate impact on DTO-G resource application, over the fifth cluster options indicates 
that there are other interactions or variables that come into play at the three-attack level. 
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5. Summary of Results and Analyses 
Overall, DTOs -A and -E are the most lucrative targets in the SNet, followed 
closely by DTOs -B and -F. When multiple DTOs are attacked, certain combinations of 
DTOs that are inconsequential in scenarios with fewer attacks may exhibit a synergistic 
effect and provide surprisingly large relative reductions in trafficking profit. Other 
combinations provide no additional benefit or actually perform worse than plans with 
fewer attacks. 
When only one attack is available, the top three attack plans—A, B, and E—all 
focus on DTOs that provide significant contributions to the task of moving cocaine from 
Colombia to Central America, primarily by maritime means. Reductions in profit for 
these three attack options range between 12.6‒21.2%. 
When two attacks are available, three of the top five performing attack plans 
include DTO-A, and four of the top five incorporate either or both of the source zone 
DTOs. The one outlier in the top 5 is a GH attack (3rd best) that provides us with the first 
evidence of potentially unforeseen synergistic attack effects. A single attack on DTO-E, 
however, dominates any other dual attack against two Mexican cartel-level DTOs. 
Reductions in profit for the top five dual attack options range between 34.1‒91.0%. 
The triple attack options yield some interesting results. The dual AB attack 
dominates every triple attack plan, and the 2nd-best dual AE attack dominates all but two 
triple attack plans, with the exceptions being EFG (74.4% profit reduction) and AEF 
(63.5%). As with the dual attack results, a triple attack plan focused on the Mexican 
cartel-level DTOs (the EGH attack) is dominated by at least seven other dual and triple 
attack plans.  
So one of the primary questions the reader may ask is, “Why not simply consider 
only the dual AB attack?” The primary reason is that it may not be practical or feasible to 
remove every source zone DTO in the real world. The collapse of the major Colombian 
cartels in the late-1990s and early-2000s led to a complete fracturing of the drug trade 
emanating from this region. A dual AB attack for the model would be akin to removing 
perhaps a dozen real-world minor DTOs that might easily reconstitute or shift unmet 
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trafficking demand to surviving DTOs relatively easily. While this is not explicitly 
modeled for this thesis, the enumeration of attacks allows us quickly see the effect of 
constraining our attack options. 
For instance, if we were to constrain our choices to attacking no more than one 
source zone DTO, the best dual attack option is AE (49.2%), while the only triple attack 
options that would be more beneficial are EFG and AEF. Likewise, if it is deemed 
infeasible to attack more than one Mexican cartel-level DTO, the remaining triple attack 
option is AEF. Note that in each of these cases (AE, EFG, and AEF), at least 2/3 of the 
SPSS resources are no longer available. This suggests that while GFBs may account for 
more trafficking events, and perhaps a majority of tonnage moved, the SPSS remains a 
high payoff resource for the traffickers, and a potential vulnerability to exploit—not by 
traditional interdiction-at-sea, but by preventing their construction and use in the first 
place by interdicting the social network financiers and managers. 
We may also use secondary information provided by the DTOSFNI model to 
evaluate evidence-gathering prospects or to observe potential responses by remaining 
DTOs under a given attack plan. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The value of a model comes from the unforeseen insights it provides the decision 
maker. The drug trafficking problem is certainly a very complex and extensive one—so 
much so that there is no guarantee of obtaining optimum attack results by simply 
“eyeballing” the problem using experience and instinct. It is clear that DTOs are not alike 
and cannot be targeted haphazardly; even intuition-based grouping or categorization of 
DTOs is insufficient in determining the best entities to target. However, we have shown 
that a comprehensive, methodical, and analytical approach, such as the one used to 
develop the DTOSFNI model, can help elicit otherwise unforeseen insights and be useful 
for informing the development of counterdrug strategy and/or policy. 
As cocaine can only be produced in a very limited area of the world, it is not 
surprising that eliminating almost all primary means for cocaine to leave this area (the 
AB attack) would yield the best results in our hypothetical situation. No one needs a 
model such as DTOSFNI to make this observation. Where the DTOSFNI model is useful 
is in addressing, “What else?” if such an attack plan was not feasible.  
It is also extremely useful when a problem exceeds the capability of “manual” 
alternatives. Our simplified hypothetical model only has nine nodes that can be 
interdicted, yet even this allows for 84 possible combinations of three-attack plans. Of 
these 84 possibilities, fewer than 5% are even worth considering. The chances of 
choosing one these superior plans by happenstance are extremely slim, as are the chances 
of learning that most of this performance can be attained with specific combinations that 
use only two attacks. Now expand the fidelity of the model to include just five 
“individuals” within each of the nine DTOs for a total of 45 nodes that can be interdicted. 
To attack just three of these 45 nodes, there are 14,190 possible options, most of which 
will actually prove to be unfruitful. To attack the equivalent of what we show in this 
thesis would require 15 attacks, or 3.4*1011 combinations. What would be impossible to 
analyze manually (or qualitatively), quantitative analytical methods makes possible.  
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Even with such an expanded problem, there is value in simply going through the 
process of putting the data into the DTOSFNI model. First, it requires the analyst to 
explicitly identify his or her assumptions (such as capacities, speed of advance, trust 
coefficients, etc.).  
Second, archiving such assumptions in a common format should allow different 
parties in the “blue” network (such as the FBI, DEA, U.S. military and other intelligence 
agencies, etc.) the ability to share such knowledge and challenge disparate estimates more 
transparently. Ranges in these assumptions can easily be explored using further model 
excursions to determine which assumptions are robust (those in which relatively large 
deviations do not cause divergent results) and those against which more investigative 
effort must be applied in order to turn them into facts. 
Third, increased sharing of structured information (policy restrictions 
notwithstanding) allows for the development of a true counterdrug Common Operational 
Picture (COP). One such manifestation of this COP could be a living diagram of the 
social and functional networks as described in this thesis. As DTOs come and go, the 
information in the COP could be updated by one party, vetted by a group, and quickly 
propagated as an informational update to the entire community.  
Potential applications of the DTOSFNI and its supporting analytical process, 
therefore, include not just “simple” targeting prioritizations (to support CPOT 
development and investigation prioritization), but also identify knowledge gaps and 
policy obstacles to information sharing across the counterdrug community. Investigations 
appear to be very organization- or personality-driven, not only when considering the 
adversaries, but when considering the “blue” network as well. The FBI may be focused 
on one particular DTO, and the DEA on yet another, while DOD intelligence agencies are 
spread thin between one or more other DTOs. Each blue organization’s target priorities 
may be slightly different from the others, and compartmented information and access 
often makes joint investigations difficult to execute. While there are fora, such as JIATF-
S, where information-sharing ostensibly occurs, it is often limited to the least amount of 
sharing necessary to obtain a limited end for specific, compartmented cases files. 
Empowerment of information-sharing fora, beyond what has already been—and 
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continues to be—done at JIATF-S as an example, and using a comprehensive approach 
may provide the counterdrug community with a means for increased success against the 
cocaine traffickers. 
The OCDETF CPOT list is another coordinating mechanism, and though the 
author is not privy to the prioritization schema used to develop the CPOT list, it is likely 
driven by political considerations, DTO activity levels, and perhaps DTO market 
“capitalization.” It is unclear whether a comprehensive prioritization of investigative 
effort occurs, but the DTOSFNI model can be extremely useful in supporting such a 
comprehensive approach, especially as we have shown that political or intuition-based 
priorities may be focused on the wrong entities, at least as far as reducing the traffickers’ 
profit, or cocaine flow, is concerned. Removing all the major Mexican cartels is not the 
answer, even if it were feasible. However, removing the right combinations of DTOs can 
achieve significantly greater reductions in profit, and the DTOSFNI model can help 
identify which combinations to pursue. 
The DTOSFNI model can be used to anticipate DTO responses to attack, at least 
in terms of social resource transfers and direct applications to the functional network. 
While we focus on how attacks change the level of overt activity of a particular behind-
the-scenes DTO, this same approach can be used to evaluate how any DTO may react to 
a network attack and law enforcement can set up evidence-gathering efforts accordingly. 
Direct applications of resources may be observed while resource transfers inevitably 
involve increased communication between previously less-connected DTOs, which may 
also be exploited. Evidence-gathering and actual interdiction activity can and should 
inform each other: they are not mutually exclusive goals. 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the value of combining traditional 
operations research and social analysis techniques into a hybrid model that considers both 
the social actors themselves and the goals they are attempting to achieve, in order to 
evaluate interdiction options to disrupt achievement of those goals. As in all studies of 
this nature, the DTOSFNI model and the structured methodology described herein may 
provide a foundation upon which to build more sophisticated models or approaches. 
Future work could include the use of real-world LES data, expansion of the DTO nodes 
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to include individual person nodes, modification of the DTOSFNI model to consider 
competing DTOs and/or cartels, and consideration of “balloon” effects (the idea that 
putting pressure on one set of drug routes or DTOs simply creates increased activity in a 
different region), among others.  
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL DATA 
Appendix A provides data that is either: a) not presented elsewhere in this thesis, 
or b) presented elsewhere but is provided in greater detail here. Geo-physical data 
specific to each FNet arc are shown in Table 13. 













1_1 SA_Source_Pac SA_Coast_Pac Truck 173 346 25 13.8
1_2 SA_Source_Carib SA_Coast_Pac Plane_Sngl 585 1,170 140 8.4
2_1 SA_Source_Carib SA_Coast_Carib Truck 232 464 25 18.6
2_2 SA_Source_Pac SA_Coast_Carib Plane_Sngl 630 1,260 140 9
3_1 SA_Source_Pac CA_Trans Plane_Twin 1,130 2,260 190 12
3_2 SA_Source_Carib CA_Trans Plane_Twin 950 1,900 200 9.6
3_3 SA_Coast_Pac CA_Trans GFB_Long 1,260 2,520 10 256
3_4 SA_Coast_Pac CA_Trans SPSS 1,000 1,000 8 250
3_5 SA_Coast_Carib CA_Trans GFB_Short 684 1,368 12 114
4_1 CA_Trans Mex_Trans Truck 574 1,148 25 46
4_2 CA_Trans Mex_Trans Plane_Sngl 386 772 140 5.6
4_3 CA_Trans Mex_Trans Plane_Twin 386 772 200 3.8
5_1 Mex_Trans Mex_Border Truck 2,067 4,134 35 118
5_2 Mex_Trans Mex_Border Plane_Sngl 1,544 3,088 140 26
5_3 Mex_Trans Mex_Border Plane_Twin 1,544 3,088 200 17.4
6_1 Mex_Border US_Border Tunnel 0.25 0.5 2 0.26
7_1 Mex_Border US_Border_UL Plane_UL 13 26 50 0.52
8_1 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 234 468 50 9.4
8_2 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 234 468 65 7.2
8_3 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Plane_Sngl 234 468 140 4
8_4 Mex_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Plane_Twin 234 468 200 3
8_5 US_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 233 466 50 9.4
8_6 US_Border US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 233 466 65 7.2
8_7 US_Border_UL US_Sink_Phoenix Truck 224 448 50 9
8_8 US_Border_UL US_Sink_Phoenix Auto 224 448 65 7
All distances are converted to statute miles and all speeds are in miles per hour. All air 
routes are considered to be point-to-point direct, with the exception of 3_1 and 3_2 which 
take the shortest routes from the Colombian production areas to southern Honduras while 
also avoiding Nicaraguan airspace. The round trip times shown do not take into 
consideration on- or off-load times, maintenance periods or any reset delays.  
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Data used for the FNet arc capacity functions approximations are shown in 
Table 14. 





























1_1 Truck 6 1 5.4 4 4.5 12 3.9 
1_2 Plane_Sngl 2 1 0.5 2 0.4 4 0.3 
2_1 Truck 6 1 5.4 2 4.5 8 3.9 
2_2 Plane_Sngl 2 1 0.5 2 0.4 4 0.3 
3_1 Plane_Twin 1 1 0.5 2 0.45 3 0 
3_2 Plane_Twin 2 1 1.4 2 1.3 3 1.1 
3_3 GFB_Long 2 3 2 6 1.6 12 1.2 
3_4 SPSS 1 2 8 4 6 8 5 
3_5 GFB_Short 3 2 3 4 2.4 8 1.8 
4_1 Truck 4 4 4 8 3.2 15 2.4 
4_2 Plane_Sngl 2 1 0.5 2 0.4 3 0.34 
4_3 Plane_Twin 2 1 1.4 3 1.3 7 1.2 
5_1 Truck 4 8 1.6 20 1.2 40 0.8 
5_2 Plane_Sngl 3 1 0.75 2 0.6 3 0.51 
5_3 Plane_Twin 2 1 1.4 3 1.3 7 1.2 
6_1 Tunnel 1 2 8 5 7 12 5 
7_1 Plane_UL 8 2 0.8 4 0.72 10 0.56 
8_1 Truck 6 6 1.5 12 0.9 24 0.48 
8_2 Auto 8 3 0.24 15 0.2 30 0.12 
8_3 Plane_Sngl 3 2 0.6 4 0.54 6 0.51 
8_4 Plane_Twin 2 1 1.4 2 1.3 3 1.2 
8_5 Truck 9 5 2.25 10 1.35 20 0.45 
8_6 Auto 12 3 0.36 10 0.3 20 0.18 
8_7 Truck 9 3 2.25 6 1.35 10 0.45 
8_8 Auto 12 3 0.36 10 0.3 20 0.18 
Shown here are the specific data used for the Capacity Function described in the 
formulation discussion in Chapter 3. Each break point threshold indicates the upper 
bound to which each asset has a certain monthly per-unit capacity as indicated by the 
corresponding slope. The bp3 threshold also signifies the upper limit of a given resource 
that may be applied to the arc. Using the single-engine plane on arc 1_2 as an example, 
we see that one plane may make two round trips per month. A graphical depiction of the 
arc 1_2 capacity function is provided in Figure 20. 
  
 71
Figure 20 is a specific version of Figure 12 (in Chapter III) using the data for 
FNet arc 1_2. 
 
 
Figure 20.  Piecewise-Linear Capacity Function for a  
Specific Functional Network Arc 
This is a specific example of Figure 12 in Chapter III for FNet arc 1_2 that uses the 
single-engine plane resource. The only values provided in the data are the breakpoint-
slope pairs. The capacity of the arc is then derived from the number of planes applied by 
the SNet DTO nodes. If four airplanes are provided, the arc capacity is 1.5t, whereas if 
three airplanes are provided, the arc capacity is 1.2t. 
Resource cost data specific to each FNet arc are shown in Table 15.  
  
 72













Cost per Unit 
Resource 
($1MM) 
1_1 Truck 6 0.0002 0.0012 
1_2 Plane_Sngl 2 0.041 0.082 
2_1 Truck 6 0.0003 0.0018 
2_2 Plane_Sngl 2 0.041 0.082 
3_1 Plane_Twin 1 0.1035 0.1035 
3_2 Plane_Twin 2 0.1029 0.2058 
3_3 GFB_Long 2 0.063 0.126 
3_4 SPSS 1 1 1 
3_5 GFB_Short 3 0.051 0.153 
4_1 Truck 4 0.0008 0.0032 
4_2 Plane_Sngl 2 0.0508 0.1016 
4_3 Plane_Twin 2 0.0512 0.1024 
5_1 Truck 4 0.002 0.008 
5_2 Plane_Sngl 3 0.051 0.153 
5_3 Plane_Twin 2 0.056 0.112 
6_1 Tunnel 1 0.5 0.5 
7_1 Plane_UL 8 0.0073 0.0584 
8_1 Truck 6 0.0053 0.0318 
8_2 Auto 8 0.0051 0.0408 
8_3 Plane_Sngl 3 0.0505 0.1515 
8_4 Plane_Twin 2 0.0508 0.1016 
8_5 Truck 9 0.0002 0.0018 
8_6 Auto 12 0.0001 0.0012 
8_7 Truck 9 0.0002 0.0018 
8_8 Auto 12 0.0001 0.0012 
Shown here are the specific cost data for each mode particular to a given FNet arc. The 
total monthly cost is the product of the number of roundtrips an asset can make and the 
cost per round trip. These costs are the same no matter which DTO applies the given 
resource to the given arc. The only exceptions are the increased costs due to the behavior 
parameters discussed in Chapter IV, Section A. 
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APPENDIX B. COMPLETE RESULTS 
Appendix B provides the complete DTOSFNI model results and is structured 
similarly to Chapter IV, Section B. All tabular results are shown in decreasing order of 
reduction in profit from the base, un-interdicted case. Profit and the amount of cocaine 
flow that reaches the U.S. homeland are highly correlated; dividing the Objective Value 
for a given attack plan by 100 provides a rough estimate of the associated monthly flow 
of cocaine that reaches the U.S. in metric tons. Typically, the flow reduction percentage 
is within 0.6% of the profit reduction percentage. In cases where the error is larger (up to 
2.5% error), the approximation described above actually underestimates the flow 
reductions (e.g., the flow reduction percentage is up to 2.5% greater than the profit 
reduction percentage). The baseline and single attack plan results are shown in Table 16. 
















Base 5289.65 N/A N/A N/A 
A 4167.60 1122.05 21.2% (0.64) 
B 4607.64 682.01 12.9% (0.64) 
E 4622.50 667.15 12.6% 9.49  
H 5062.57 227.08 4.3% 29.88  
F 5190.45 99.20 1.9% 18.72  
G 5289.29 0.36 0.0% (0.64) 
C 5289.59 0.06 0.0% 12.02  
I 5289.61 0.04 0.0% 20.74  
D 5289.62 0.03 0.0% 0.00  
Single attack and baseline, non-interdicted results are shown in decreasing order of 
effectiveness. The Objective Value is the solution returned by the DTOSFNI model. 
Reduction from Base is the difference of the particular attack plan results from the 
baseline case, and is also shown as a percentage. The last column shows how a particular 
attack plan affects overt DTO-G activity compared to baseline (DTO-G uses 0.64 tunnel 
in the base case). Red parenthetical values represent a decrease, while black value 




Complete dual attack plan results are shown in Table 17. 















AB 474.05 4815.60  91.0% (0.64) 
AE 2688.39 2601.26  49.2% 0.36  
GH 3332.43 1957.22  37.0% (0.64) 
AF 3409.25 1880.40  35.5% (0.64) 
BE 3484.50 1805.15  34.1% (0.64) 
EF 3864.38 1425.27  26.9% 19.36  
AH 4167.57 1122.08  21.2% 9.88  
AI 4167.59 1122.06  21.2% 8.65  
AC 4167.60 1122.05  21.2% (0.64) 
AD 4167.60 1122.05  21.2% (0.64) 
AG 4167.60 1122.05  21.2% (0.64) 
BF 4281.24 1008.41  19.1% 5.65  
BH 4607.30 682.35  12.9% 9.88  
BI 4607.62 682.03  12.9% 10.77  
BD 4607.63 682.02  12.9% (0.64) 
BC 4607.64 682.01  12.9% (0.64) 
BG 4607.64 682.01  12.9% (0.64) 
EH 4619.62 670.03  12.7% 38.51  
EI 4621.41 668.24  12.6% 40.36  
EG 4621.75 667.90  12.6% (0.64) 
CE 4622.50 667.15  12.6% 12.94  
DE 4622.50 667.15  12.6% 9.49  
HI 4792.82 496.83  9.4% 37.43  
CH 4803.95 485.70  9.2% 29.88  
FH 4855.79 433.86  8.2% 37.43  
GI 4951.72 337.93  6.4% (0.64) 
FG 4964.26 325.39  6.2% (0.64) 
DH 5054.23 235.42  4.5% 29.88  
CG 5096.43 193.22  3.7% (0.64) 
DF 5100.49 189.16  3.6% 19.49  
DG 5158.92 130.73  2.5% (0.64) 
CF 5169.52 120.13  2.3% 36.00  
FI 5185.21 104.44  2.0% 40.36  
CD 5188.07 101.58  1.9% 17.83  
CI 5289.42 0.23  0.0% 39.84  
DI 5289.51 0.14  0.0% 39.38  
Dual attacks are shown in decreasing order of effectiveness. 
 75
A subset of dual attack plans that provide a marginal benefit over a single attack 
component is shown in Table 18. 











AB 474.05 4815.60  91.0% 
AE 2688.39 2601.26  49.2% 
GH 3332.43 1957.22  37.0% 
AF 3409.25 1880.40  35.5% 
BE 3484.50 1805.15  34.1% 
EF 3864.38 1425.27  26.9% 
BF 4281.24 1008.41  19.1% 
HI 4792.82 496.83  9.4% 
CH 4803.95 485.70  9.2% 
FH 4855.79 433.86  8.2% 
GI 4951.72 337.93  6.4% 
FG 4964.26 325.39  6.2% 
DH 5054.23 235.42  4.5% 
CG 5096.43 193.22  3.7% 
DF 5100.49 189.16  3.6% 
DG 5158.92 130.73  2.5% 
CF 5169.52 120.13  2.3% 
FI 5185.21 104.44  2.0% 
CD 5188.07 101.58  1.9% 
Only dual attacks that provide a marginal benefit over the maximum single attack 
component are shown here. For example, a dual AE attack yields a reduction of 49.2% 
which is greater than a single attack on either DTO-A or -E (21.2% and 12.6%, 
respectively). Conversely, a dual BC attack is omitted from this table since that attack 
plan yields a 12.9% reduction, which is what a single attack on DTO-B provides. 
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A subset of dual attack plans that provide no marginal benefit over a single attack 
component is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19.   Marginally Ineffective Two-DTO Attack Plans 
AC AH BD BI DE EG 
AD AI BG CE DI EI 
AG BC BH CI EH FI 
These attack plans provide either fractional (<0.1%) or no additional benefit over a single 
attack on one of its components. In most cases, the beneficial single attack is on either 
DTO-A, -B, or -E. DTO-C, -D, and -I proved unfruitful in the single attack results and 
provide no added value when combined with A, B, or E. It is noteworthy to see that the 
EG and the EH attacks have no benefit over a single DTO-E attack, even though each 
comprise 2/3 of the Mexican cartel leadership triad. 
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Complete triple attacks are shown in Table 20.  























ABC 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ADH 4167.55 1122.10  21.2%
ABD 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ADI 4167.56 1122.09  21.2%
ABE 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ACI 4167.59 1122.06  21.2%
ABF 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ACD 4167.60 1122.05  21.2%
ABG 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ACG 4167.60 1122.05  21.2%
ABH 474.05 4815.60  91.0% ADG 4167.60 1122.05  21.2%
ABI 474.05 4815.60  91.0% HFI 4205.19 1084.46  20.5%
EFG 1353.45 3936.20  74.4% FGI 4275.10 1014.55  19.2%
AEF 1929.94 3359.71  63.5% BFH 4280.61 1009.04  19.1%
AEH 2688.38 2601.27  49.2% BFI 4281.05 1008.60  19.1%
AEI 2688.38 2601.27  49.2% BFG 4281.19 1008.46  19.1%
AEC 2688.39 2601.26  49.2% BCF 4281.24 1008.41  19.1%
AED 2688.39 2601.26  49.2% CFH 4420.86 868.79  16.4%
AEG 2688.39 2601.26  49.2% CEH 4429.90 859.75  16.3%
BEF 2726.09 2563.56  48.5% CEG 4496.61 793.04  15.0%
GHC 3062.86 2226.79  42.1% CFG 4534.99 754.66  14.3%
GHF 3158.52 2131.13  40.3% DEH 4536.20 753.45  14.2%
EHG 3173.86 2115.79  40.0% BDG 4551.02 738.63  14.0%
GHA 3189.47 2100.18  39.7% BHI 4573.38 716.27  13.5%
GHB 3223.56 2066.09  39.1% DEG 4580.54 709.11  13.4%
GHI 3239.55 2050.10  38.8% BCD 4586.41 703.24  13.3%
GHD 3243.5 2046.15  38.7% CHI 4599.53 690.12  13.0%
AFD 3319.27 1970.38  37.2% BCH 4606.58 683.07  12.9%
AFH 3409.24 1880.41  35.5% BGI 4606.79 682.86  12.9%
AFC 3409.25 1880.40  35.5% BDH 4607.29 682.36  12.9%
AFG 3409.25 1880.40  35.5% BDI 4607.61 682.04  12.9%
AFI 3409.25 1880.40  35.5% BCI 4607.62 682.03  12.9%
BEH 3484.46 1805.19  34.1% BCG 4607.63 682.02  12.9%
BEI 3484.47 1805.18  34.1% CEI 4621.09 668.56  12.6%
BEC 3484.50 1805.15  34.1% DEI 4621.37 668.28  12.6%
BED 3484.50 1805.15  34.1% CDE 4622.49 667.16  12.6%
BEG 3484.50 1805.15  34.1% CGI 4684.75 604.90  11.4%
EFD 3774.43 1515.22  28.6% DHI 4717.74 571.91  10.8%
BFD 3831.21 1458.44  27.6% DFH 4729.27 560.38  10.6%
EFH 3862.48 1427.17  27.0% DFG 4754.48 535.17  10.1%
EFI 3863.08 1426.57  27.0% CDH 4772.44 517.21  9.8%
EFC 3864.38 1425.27  26.9% DGI 4821.96 467.69  8.8%
EHI 3911.00 1378.65  26.1% CFI 4845.83 443.82  8.4%
EGI 4012.06 1277.59  24.2% CDG 4861.18 428.47  8.1%
AHI 4166.50 1123.15  21.2% CDF 4909.22 380.43  7.2%
AGI 4167.20 1122.45  21.2% DFI 4997.96 291.69  5.5%
ACH 4167.45 1122.20  21.2% CDI 5167.65 122.00  2.3%
Applied DTO-G resources are not included in the results. 
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A subset of triple attacks that provide marginal benefit and perform better than a 
single attack on DTO-E is shown in Table 21. 











EFG* 1353.45 3936.20  74.4% 
AEF* 1929.94 3359.71  63.5% 
BEF* 2726.09 2563.56  48.5% 
GHC* 3062.86 2226.79  42.1% 
GHF* 3158.52 2131.13  40.3% 
EHG 3173.86 2115.79  40.0% 
GHA* 3189.47 2100.18  39.7% 
GHB* 3223.56 2066.09  39.1% 
GHI* 3239.55 2050.10  38.8% 
GHD* 3243.50 2046.15  38.7% 
AFD* 3319.27 1970.38  37.2% 
AFH* 3409.24 1880.41  35.5% 
EFD* 3774.43 1515.22  28.6% 
BFD* 3831.21 1458.44  27.6% 
EHI 3911.00 1378.65  26.1% 
EGI 4012.06 1277.59  24.2% 
HFI 4205.19 1084.46  20.5% 
FGI 4275.10 1014.55  19.2% 
CFH 4420.86 868.79  16.4% 
CEH 4429.90 859.75  16.3% 
CEG 4496.61 793.04  15.0% 
CFG 4534.99 754.66  14.3% 
DEH 4536.20 753.45  14.2% 
BDG 4551.02 738.63  14.0% 
BHI 4573.38 716.27  13.5% 
DEG 4580.54 709.11  13.4% 
BCD 4586.41 703.24  13.3% 
CHI 4599.53 690.12  13.0% 
Only the 28 triple attacks that provide a marginal benefit over the maximum underlying 
single attack or dual attack component, and perform better than a single attack on DTO-
E, are shown here. An asterisk indicates marginally effective attack plans that build upon 
the top seven dual attack plans; the two leading letter in each attack indicate the dual 
attack being augmented. Of note, there are no triple attacks that include AB included in 
these results. 
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A subset of triple attacks that perform no better than a single attack on DTO-E is 
shown in Table 22. 
Table 22.   Three-DTO Attack Plans That Yield Negligible Results 
CGI CDH DFG DGI 
CDF CDI DFH DHI 
CDG CFI DFI  
These 11 triple attack plans provide yield no better profit reductions than does a single E 
attack plan. Another 45 triple attack plans provide little (<0.1%) or no marginal benefit 
over the best underlying dual attack plan component. 
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